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REINING IN ABUSES OF EXECUTIVE POWER THROUGH
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Rosalie Berger Levinson*
“‘The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against
arbitrary action of government.’”1
Abstract
Although substantive due process is one of the most confusing and
controversial areas of constitutional law, it is well established that the Due
Process Clause includes a substantive component that “bars certain
arbitrary wrongful government actions ‘regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them.’” The Court has recognized
substantive due process limitations on law-enforcement personnel, public-
school officials, government employers, and those who render decisions
that affect our property rights. Government officials who act with intent
to harm or with deliberate indifference to our rights have been found to
engage in conduct that “shocks the judicial conscience” contrary to the
guarantee of substantive due process.
A burgeoning body of case law, however, has limited substantive due
process as a viable restraint on the conduct of officials in the executive
branch of government. Some appellate courts have restricted substantive
due process to claims involving deprivation of a fundamental right. Others
have rejected all claims where only deprivation of property is at stake, or
they have dismissed such claims where state law provides a remedy, thus
confounding the treatment of procedural and substantive due process
520 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
claims. Further, the courts have narrowly defined the concept of a duty of
care to immunize raw abuses of executive power.
This Article asserts that substantive due process should be recognized
as a meaningful limitation on arbitrary abuses of executive power and that
victims of such abuse should not be relegated to the vagaries and
increasing hurdles imposed by state tort law. The Article summarizes the
origins and development of substantive due process in the Supreme Court
as a limitation on legislative, judicial, and executive power. It then
critiques the positions adopted by federal appellate courts regarding
substantive due process as a limitation on executive power. It addresses
separation of powers and federalism concerns that have been used to
justify a crabbed interpretation of substantive due process. Finally, the
Article suggests ways for attorneys litigating on behalf of government
employees, arrestees and detainees, students, and landowners to invoke
substantive due process as a meaningful restraint against misuse of
executive power.
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2. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18
(1980) (“‘[S]ubstantive due process’ is a contradiction in terms.”); Daniel O. Conkle, Three
Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 63–65 (2006) (“Substantive due process
is in serious disarray, with the Supreme Court simultaneously embracing two, and perhaps three,
competing and inconsistent theories of decisionmaking.”); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process
and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 494 (1997) (“[S]ubstantive due process is not just
an error but a contradiction in terms.”); Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and
Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2004) (calling substantive due process “the most
anticonstitutional branch of constitutional law”); see also Mark Tushnet, Can You Watch
Unenumerated Rights Drift?, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 209 (2006) (discussing the challenges of
identifying and enforcing unenumerated rights); Frank I. Michelman, Unenumerated Rights Under
Popular Constitutionalism, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 121 (2006) (examining the distinction between
numerated and unenumerated rights in a vacuum of judicial review); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some
Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
309 (1993) (using Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), to examine the doctrinal confusion in
Supreme Court due process cases).
3. See infra notes 20–24 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 34–45 and accompanying text.
5. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); see also Gregory P. Magarian,
Substantive Due Process as a Source of Constitutional Protection for Nonpolitical Speech, 90
MINN. L. REV. 247, 281–82 (2005) (“Although substantive due process doctrine lacks a
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Substantive due process is one of the most confusing and most
controversial areas of constitutional law.  In part, this controversy is due2
to the Supreme Court’s “false start” in using substantive due process to
invalidate arguably legitimate economic legislation during the Lochner
era.  In part, it is due to the Court’s use of substantive due process to3
provide extraordinary protection to certain contentious non-textual rights,
such as the right to terminate a pregnancy.  Substantive due process raises4
core questions regarding the proper role of the judiciary in reviewing the
actions of the other branches of government, both horizontally (legislative
and executive) and vertically (state and local government). Yet despite all
the controversy, one principle is well established: The Due Process Clause
includes a substantive component that “bar[s] certain [arbitrary wrongful]
government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them.”  The late Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged 5
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straightforward foundation in the constitutional text, its resilience over time testifies to our legal
system’s deeply rooted insight that a constitutional culture of individual rights must accommodate
substantive protections of essential human activities.”); Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 885 (6th
Cir. 1992) (“Virtually every member of the Court has acknowledged that the Due Process Clause
does have a substantive component, however difficult it may be to discern its contours.”).
6. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (citations omitted) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,
527 (1884) and Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
277 (1856)). In Daniels, Justice Rehnquist rejected the claim brought by an inmate against a
correctional deputy who negligently left a pillow on the stairs causing the inmate injury, reasoning
that the Due Process Clause does not “supplant traditional tort law,” but Rehnquist did not question
the appropriateness of applying due process to “deliberate decisions of government officials to
deprive a person of life, liberty, or property.” Id. at 332, 331. Even Justice Scalia, one of the most
outspoken opponents of substantive due process, acknowledged in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 121 (1989), that substantive due process was available to protect rights. Scalia contended
that the doctrine should protect only the historic practices of our society and that the liberty interest
must be narrowly defined to encompass only rights traditionally protected at common law. Id. at
124–27. Under his approach, laws that do not implicate fundamental rights would be subject only
to “the ordinary ‘rational relationship’ test.” Id. at 131; see also Philip Morris USA v. Williams,
127 S. Ct. 1057, 1067 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is far too late in the day to argue that the
Due Process Clause merely guarantees fair procedure and imposes no substantive limits on a State’s
lawmaking power.”); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275–76 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(rejecting “the proposition that the Due Process Clause guarantees certain [unspecified] liberties”
but conceding that “this Court’s current jurisprudence is otherwise”).
7. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).
8. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.3.3, at 500–03 (3d ed. 2006)
(describing the debate among Justices and commentators over which liberties to include).
9. Id. § 6.3.3, at 499–507.
the traditional and common-sense notion that the Due Process
Clause, like its forebear in the Magna Carta, was “intended to
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the
powers of government[.]” . . . [B]y barring certain
government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them, it serves to prevent
governmental power from being “used for purposes of
oppression.”6
Determining what is an arbitrary exercise of power that
violates substantive due process has never been an easy task. It is, for
example, through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
that most of the Bill of Rights were incorporated and applied to the states,7
but only after years of debate.  Eventually, the Court determined that most8
of the safeguards in the Bill of Rights are substantive values
included in the term “liberty,” and, therefore, these values are protected
from arbitrary state interference.  The Court has also used substantive due9
process to designate non-explicit or non-textual rights as “fundamental”
or “core liberty interests,” which have been afforded extraordinary
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10. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the Court reaffirmed that it has
never accepted the view that the Fourteenth Amendment protects only liberties recognized in the
Bill of Rights because that document does not mark “the outer limits of the substantive sphere of
liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.” Id. at 847–48. Thus, the Due Process Clause
has been used to invalidate arbitrary state laws that violate substantive, fundamental rights even if
such rights do not derive from the text of the Constitution. Id.
11. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, §§ 10.2–.3, at 798–844.
12. See infra Part II.B. For a recent criticism of these splintered opinions, see F. Patrick
Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages Awards: “Morals Without
Technique”?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349 (2008).
13. John F. Basiak, Jr., The Roberts Court and the Future of Substantive Due Process: The
Demise of “Split-the-Difference” Jurisprudence?, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 861 (2007) (challenging
the development of substantive due process as lacking historical foundation and as an
impermissible aggrandizement of judicial power); Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive
Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 121 (2005) (arguing that the Court’s use of substantive due process
to challenge punitive damage awards “appears to be textually untethered”); see also commentators
cited supra note 2.
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. See infra Part III.C.
16. See infra Part III.C.
17. See infra Part III.A.
protection.  Thus, laws that interfere with marital, procreative, or10
familial privacy have been subjected to more rigorous scrutiny,  but11
significant disagreement exists about which rights, if any, merit this
greater protection. Further, in recent years the Court, in severely splintered
opinions, has invoked substantive due process to overturn “grossly
excessive” punitive damage awards.12
While many commentators have criticized the Court for its substantive
due process decisions invalidating legislative enactments and punitive
damage awards,  commentators have paid less attention to the burgeoning13
body of case law in the appellate courts addressing the use of substantive
due process to limit the conduct of officials in the executive branch.
Arguably, their conduct, no less than that of officials in the legislative and
judicial branches, must conform to the basic due process standard of
reasonableness. The circuits strongly disagree, however, about when
substantive due process may be used to challenge arbitrary deprivations of
life, liberty, and property by executive officials, such as police officers,
prison wardens, public-school educators, public employers, and
administrative agencies. Some lower courts have restricted substantive due
process to claims involving deprivation of a “fundamental right.”  Others14
have rejected all claims involving only deprivation of property  or have15
dismissed such claims where state law provides a remedy, thus
confounding the treatment of procedural and substantive due process
claims.  Further, many appellate courts have narrowly defined the concept16
of a duty of care to immunize official misconduct.17
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18. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 847 (1992) (acknowledging that due process has its roots in the Magna Carta); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 379 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (“‘[T]he words, ‘due process of law,’ were
undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words, ‘by the law of the land,’ in Magna
Charta.’” (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvment Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
Arguably, it is particularly critical that courts recognize substantive due
process violations by executive branch officials to deter and punish abuses
of power. Arbitrary deprivations of liberty and property are less likely to
occur when a legislative body reaches a deliberate decision or a judge
upholds a jury’s award of punitive damages. Yet courts have been
reluctant to recognize substantive due process claims brought by pretrial
detainees, public employees and licensees, public-school students, and
landowners, who allege that they have been arbitrarily deprived of their
liberty or property by guards, government employers, teachers, or
members of administrative agencies. As with all challenges to substantive
due process, the defendants raise separation of powers and federalism
concerns.
This Article asserts that courts should recognize substantive due
process as a meaningful limitation on arbitrary abuses of executive power
and that victims of such abuse should not be relegated to the vagaries and
increasing hurdles of state tort law. Part II of this Article briefly
summarizes the origins and development of substantive due process as a
limitation on legislative, judicial, and executive power. Part III critiques
the positions adopted by federal appellate courts regarding substantive due
process as a limitation on executive power. Finally, Part IV addresses
separation of powers and federalism concerns, and suggests ways for
government employees, arrestees and detainees, students, and landowners
to use substantive due process as a meaningful restraint against misuse of
executive power.
II.  ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE
                 PROCESS IN THE SUPREME COURT             
To understand and critique the restricted approach to substantive due
process that many lower courts have adopted, it is necessary to first
understand how the Supreme Court has interpreted this doctrine. The first
two sections briefly explicate the use of substantive due process to limit
legislative enactments and punitive damages. These sections provide the
backdrop for exploring the Supreme Court’s development of substantive
due process as a limitation on executive action.
A.  The Use of Substantive Due Process to Limit Legislative Enactments
The concept of substantive due process has strong historical roots
dating back to the Magna Carta and Lockean tradition.  History confirms18
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276 (1856)). In addition, the Magna Carta’s influence on the development of constitutional due
process rights is described in JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 7 (2003).
19. See Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24
HARV. L. REV. 366 (1911) (discussing the impact of pre-Civil War constitutional law on the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Henry Paul Monaghan, Of “Liberty” and
“Property,” 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 411–14 (1977); Jeffrey S. Koehlinger, Note, Substantive
Due Process Analysis and the Lockean Liberal Tradition: Rethinking the Modern Privacy Cases,
65 IND. L.J. 723, 734–36 (1990).
20. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
21. Id. at 589.
22. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
23. Id. at 52.
24. Id. at 56.
25. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937), signaled the demise of
Lochner’s economic substantive due process. See also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729–30
(1963) (“There was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike down laws
which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some particular economic
or social philosophy. . . . [This] doctrine . . . has long since been discarded.”).
26. In his Lochner dissent, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., contended that it would
pervert the concept of liberty to invalidate democratically adopted statutes “unless it can be said
that . . . the statute . . . would infringe [on] fundamental principles as they have been understood
by the traditions of our people and our law.” Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Thus,
even the dissenters acknowledged substantive due process but would simply not have invoked it
with regard to this type of statute. See Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 988 (1979) (noting that during the Lochner era the Court
“infused that clause with a noneconomic substantive content that has survived subsequent
pruning”); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 877 (1987) (describing
the continuing impact that Lochner has had on the development of substantive due process). 
that the Framers intended that natural rights retained by the people be
protected and that government be allowed to legislate only for the good of
society.  The Supreme Court first used substantive due process to19
invalidate economic legislation that the Court considered unduly
restrictive of liberty. In Allgeyer v. Louisiana,  the Court invalidated a20
state statute that prohibited obtaining insurance on Louisiana property
from any company that failed to comply with state law. The Court
reasoned that the law interfered with the liberty of the individual “to live
and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to
pursue any livelihood or avocation.”  Allgeyer was the forerunner of the21
well-known Lochner v. New York  decision, which invalidated on22
substantive due process grounds a New York law prohibiting the
employment of bakers for more than ten hours per day or sixty hours per
week.  The Lochner Court closely scrutinized the statute and determined23
that the state lacked any rational justification for the law, which
interfered with the right to make a contract.24
Although the Supreme Court subsequently repudiated the close
scrutiny that it applied to the New York statute in Lochner,  the concept25
that substantive due process protects against arbitrary legislation remains
intact.  As to economic substantive due process, however, the Court today26
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27. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (explaining the
deferential standard that applies to economic legislation).
28. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
29. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 84, 86 (1978).
30. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955).
31. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, § 8.2.3, at 625; see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 761 (5th ed. 2005).
32. In Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), Justice David Souter stated that
Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
provided the basis for the modern doctrine of substantive due process and unenumerated rights.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 762 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Harlan explained that even if the
Magna Carta contemplated only procedural safeguards, the denial of substantive rights, despite the
availability of significant procedural safeguards, would lead to the deprivation of life, liberty, or
property. He advised that judges should balance competing interests in light of “the traditions from
which [this country] developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.” Poe, 367 U.S. at 542.
33. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
34. 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
35. 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
asks only whether a law “is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.”  The challenger has the burden to prove that the legislature27
“acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.”  Despite stressing the need to28
apply a highly deferential approach to social or economic legislation, the
Court continues to recognize that substantive due process limits the
legislative branch of government by prohibiting arbitrary and capricious
laws that unduly interfere with life, liberty, or property.  Because29
legislative enactments, at least at the state or federal level, result from
lengthy debate, most enactments cannot be successfully attacked as totally
arbitrary and capricious. In addition, to avoid the pejorative label of
“Lochnerizing,” the Court has been extremely deferential to legislative
decisions, requiring that the challenger negate every conceivable valid
justification for an enactment.  Not surprisingly, since the Lochner period30
the Court has not invalidated on substantive due process grounds a statute
that implicated only economic rights.31
In sharp contrast, where a statute interfered with personal as opposed
to economic rights, the Court has rejected this deferential approach.  In32
Griswold v. Connecticut,  the Court invalidated a state law that banned33
the use of contraceptives, finding that the statute impermissibly violated
marital privacy. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,  it upheld the right to use34
contraceptives even outside the confines of marriage, and in Roe v.
Wade,  it held that this privacy right included a woman’s decision35
whether to terminate her pregnancy. In these cases, the Court recognized
a fundamental right, even though the right did not exist in the
Constitution’s text, and the Court subjected all government regulation of
the right to strict scrutiny.
In recent years, this fundamental-rights/strict scrutiny analysis appears
to have fallen into disfavor. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
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36. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
37. Id. at 278–80 & n.7. In Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), the Supreme Court
recognized a liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs but
ruled that, in the prison context, the strict scrutiny standard was inappropriate. Id. at 211–13.
Instead, the Court held that a decision to administer drugs only had to be reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests. Id.
38. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279, 284.
39. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
40. Id. at 846, 851–53; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 315–16 (1993) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (explaining that a state threatens a person’s “core liberty interest” by restraining her
freedom to act on her own behalf).
41. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874. Most recently, in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619
(2007), the Supreme Court upheld the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1531 (Supp. IV 2004), which prohibits “intact” dilation and evacuation procedures whereby the
fetus is partially outside the womb before it is destroyed. The Court reasoned that neither the
congressional purpose nor the effect of the Act was “to place a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman seeking an abortion,” because the Act allowed a commonly used and generally accepted
method of terminating a pregnancy and simply prohibited doctors from attempting to deliver the
fetus to “an anatomical landmark.” Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1632.
42. 530 U.S. 57, 66–67 (2000).
43. Only Justice Thomas clearly stated that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard for
judging the validity of a law that interfered with the fundamental right of parents to guide the
upbringing of their children. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
44. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
of Health,  the Court recognized a liberty interest in refusing unwanted36
medical treatment but did not denominate this interest as a fundamental
right that necessarily triggered strict scrutiny.  The Court suggested that37
the liberty interest mandated serious judicial review, but instead of
applying strict scrutiny, it balanced the competing interests, ultimately
deciding that substantive due process did not prevent a state from insisting
that a person’s desire to terminate treatment be established by clear and
convincing evidence.  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern38
Pennsylvania v. Casey,  the Court refused to overturn Wade but spoke39
instead of a liberty interest,  not a fundamental right. The Court40
abandoned strict scrutiny in favor of an “undue burden” test, which
permits, prior to a fetus’s viability, state regulation that does not unduly
burden the abortion decision.  Similarly, in Troxel v. Granville,  the41 42
Court found that substantive due process protects parental rights, which
must be accorded significant weight in deciding visitation matters.
However, the majority did not use fundamental-rights or strict scrutiny
language.  Finally, in Lawrence v. Texas,  the Court recognized a liberty43 44
interest in intimate homosexual relationships, but it did not assert
fundamental-right status or the need to apply strict scrutiny. The Lawrence
Court did, however, closely scrutinize the challenged sodomy prohibition,
determining that the Texas law violated substantive due process because
the statute criminalized “the most private human conduct, sexual
528 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
45. Id. at 567.
46. See infra Part III; see also Conkle, supra note 2, at 76 (noting the Court’s shift from strict
scrutiny to a more open-ended balancing test).
47. See infra Part III.B.
48. The modern role played by substantive due process has been broadly described as a
requirement that “government must treat individuals with some minimal level of concern and
respect for their well-being.” Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the
Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REV. 201, 230 (1984).
49. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 210, 213 (asserting that the punitive damages cases provide
the classic example of the contemporary conservative Justices’ use of substantive due process to
protect unenumerated rights).
50. 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996). 
51.  See Hubbard, supra note 12, at 376; Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing
Harm, 92 MINN. L. REV. 83, 86 (2007); A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages:
The Error of Federal Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1085, 1088 (2006). 
52. 538 U.S. 408, 412, 418 (2003).
behavior,” and thus deprived homosexuals of the liberty to choose their
personal relationships.45
The Supreme Court’s rejection in recent years of a rigid
approach—which required challengers of legislative enactments to
identify a fundamental right before government action would be subject
to any meaningful review—should inform the discussion of substantive
due process challenges to misconduct by members of the executive
branch.  Contrary to the approach adopted by some appellate courts,46 47
these cases demonstrate that substantive due process analysis does not
necessarily hinge on recognition of a fundamental right. Instead, the Court
appears willing to engage in a more nuanced balancing approach to
determine whether government action should be struck as arbitrary and
unreasonable, depending on the significance of the right at stake and the
asserted justifications for the intrusion.48
B.  The Use of Substantive Due Process to Restrict Punitive
      Damage Awards
Despite reluctance to protect purely economic rights from legislative
intrusion under the rubric of substantive due process, the Court has
actively intervened to stop at least some deprivations of property by the
judiciary.  In 1996, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,  the49 50
Supreme Court held that a $2 million punitive damage award against
BMW for repainting automobiles without disclosure to customers was
“grossly excessive” and thus violated the corporation’s substantive due
process right not to be arbitrarily deprived of its property. This case
marked the first time that the Supreme Court found substantive, and not
just procedural, limitations on punitive damage awards.  Subsequently,51
in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,  the Court52
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53. 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007).
54. Id. at 1064.
55. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
56. Id. at 173.
57. Id. at 172–73.
58. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (“‘[S]ubstantive due process’ prevents
the government from engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ . . . .” (quoting Rochin, 342
U.S. at 172)); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (quoting Rochin with approval). 
59.  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
33 (1949)).
60. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (holding that the standards of the Fourth
ruled that a $145 million punitive damage award was grossly excessive in
a case where the jury awarded only $1 million in compensatory damages.
Most recently, in Philip Morris USA v. Williams,  the Court ruled that53
due process prohibits imposing punitive damages upon a defendant for
injuring persons not before the Court. Focusing primarily on procedural
concerns, Justice Breyer reasoned that, where a defendant has no
opportunity to defend against alleged injuries to non-parties, the risk of
arbitrary, uncertain awards imposed without notice is magnified.54
Although these decisions were all controversial five-to-four opinions, they
demonstrate that substantive due process may be used to challenge
arbitrary deprivations of property—not just liberty—establishing an
important principle in reviewing executive branch misconduct.
C.  The Use of Substantive Due Process to Challenge Abuse of Power
by the Executive Branch
In 1952, the Supreme Court officially recognized that substantive due
process protects against government official misconduct. In Rochin v.
California,  the Court invoked substantive due process defensively in a55
criminal proceeding to exclude evidence that was obtained by pumping the
defendant’s stomach.  The Court stated that substantive due process is56
violated by state conduct that “shocks the conscience” or constitutes force
that is “brutal” and “offend[s] even hardened sensibilities.”  The “shocks57
the conscience” standard emerged as the test for determining whether
misconduct by executive branch officials is so aggravated that it violates
substantive due process.58
Rochin involved interference with liberty in its most pristine
form—freedom from physical restraint, clearly a fundamental right. The
Court decided Rochin before incorporating the Fourth Amendment, which
prohibits states from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures, into
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court has subsequently clarified that it59
will reject any substantive due process claim that falls under a more
explicit constitutional guarantee, such as the Fourth or Eighth
Amendment.  However, the Court has recognized that pretrial detainees,60
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Amendment, rather than substantive due process, decide a claim of excessive force); Whitley, 475
U.S. at 326–27 (stating that the Eighth Amendment is “the primary source of substantive
protection” for a prisoner shot in the leg during the quelling of a riot); see also Russo v. City of
Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 206–09 (2d Cir. 2007) (reasoning that although the Supreme Court in
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979), suggested that a lengthy detention stemming directly
from law enforcement officials’ refusal to investigate exculpatory evidence was rooted in
substantive due process, more recent Supreme Court cases require that the right be analyzed under
the Fourth Amendment because physical detention following arraignment is a seizure and the
Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection); Pagan v.
Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 33–34 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that the plaintiff could not proceed under
substantive due process in challenging a government-operated bank’s denial of a loan based on
political affiliation—such a claim must be pursued under the First Amendment regardless of
whether the complaining party would be successful under this more specific provision); Willis v.
Town of Marshall, 426 F.3d 251, 266 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that a recreational dancer’s
substantive due process claim that the town banned her from a town-sponsored musical concert
allegedly due to complaints about her lewd dancing was not cognizable because the claim
completely overlapped with her equal protection claim, and thus the specific amendment with its
explicit textual source must control).
61. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 535–36, 539 (1979).
62. Youngberg v. Romeo ex rel. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (quoting Ingraham ex rel.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)).
63. Id. at 321–22.
64. Id. at 318–19.
65. Id. at 323.
66. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
who are not protected under the Eighth Amendment, have a liberty interest
in being free from arbitrary punishment and that substantive due process
creates a duty to provide detainees with protection and needed medical
care.61
In addition, the Court has recognized that those committed to state
mental institutions have a “‘historic liberty interest’” in personal security
that is “protected substantively by the Due Process Clause.”  Further,62
involuntarily committed patients “are entitled to more considerate
treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions
of confinement are designed to punish.”  Although recognizing that the63
decisions of qualified professionals should be deemed presumptively
valid, the Court nonetheless acknowledged that the liberty interest
implicated required the state “to provide minimally adequate or reasonable
training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint.”  Balancing64
the competing concerns, the Court ruled that substantive due process is
violated if professional decisions constitute “such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision
on such a judgment.”65
In 1998, the Court, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis,  revisited the66
meaning of substantive due process as a limitation on executive power. At
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67. Id. at 836–37.
68. Id. at 837.
69. Id. at 845–46. The Court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs’ substantive due process
claim should be analyzed as a Fourth Amendment seizure pursuant to Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 395 (1989), because the defendant’s conduct could not be considered a seizure of Lewis.
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842–44; see also Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 465 (6th Cir. 2006)
(citing Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1989)) (explaining that a Fourth
Amendment seizure occurs only when government terminates freedom of movement through means
intentionally applied; thus, where police simply tried to stop a suspect by flashing lights and
continued pursuits, no seizure had occurred).
70. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846.
71. Id. (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 849–50. The Court also cited Youngberg as establishing a substantive due process
violation where personnel at a state mental institution fail to provide minimally adequate training
and habilitation to those who are involuntarily committed. Id. at 852 n.12 (citing Youngberg v.
Romeo ex rel. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319–25 (1982)).
74. Id. at 854. The Court adopted the same Eighth Amendment standard used to impose
liability for harm caused in a riot case. Id.; see also Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 79–85 (2d
Cir. 2007) (reasoning that EPA officials who allegedly made affirmative assurances to site workers
engaged in search-and-rescue efforts after 9/11 that the air in Lower Manhattan was safe to
breathe—thereby creating a false sense of security that induced the workers to forgo protective
issue was the alleged reckless conduct of a deputy sheriff who conducted
a deadly high-speed chase of two boys riding a motorcycle after they
failed to obey an officer’s command to stop.  Philip Lewis, the passenger,67
was struck and killed.  The Court confirmed that substantive due process68
could be used to challenge abuses of executive power: “Since the time of
our early explanations of due process, we have understood the core of the
concept to be protection against arbitrary action . . . .”  The majority69
cautioned, however, that the “criteria to identify what is fatally arbitrary
differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a
governmental officer that is at issue.”  With regard to the latter, only “the70
most egregious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the
constitutional sense.’”  Thus, invoking Rochin, the Court ruled that only71
an abuse of power that “shocks the conscience” will be actionable.72
In Lewis, the Court further refined the Rochin test. The Lewis Court
reasoned that government officials who act with deliberate indifference to
constitutional rights “shock[] the conscience”—for example, prison guards
who are deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of pretrial
detainees.  However, because deliberate indifference implies the73
opportunity for actual deliberation, the Court determined that the standard
could not reasonably apply to police officers who face a situation calling
for fast action. Thus, the Court held that injuries resulting from “high-
speed chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their
legal plight do not give rise to liability under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”  Because the deceased’s family members did not allege74
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gear—did not violate substantive due process because the defendants were required to make
decisions using rapidly changing information in a context in which there were competing
obligations, and even if officials knew they were disclosing inaccurate information, their poor
choice could not be considered conscience-shocking); Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d 975, 979 (8th Cir.
2005) (reasoning that because police officers responding to highly unpredictable domestic
disturbances are precluded “‘the luxury . . . of having time to make unhurried judgments,’” the
intent-to-harm, rather than the deliberate-indifference, standard governs (alteration in original)
(quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853)).
75. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 855.
76. The lower courts have consistently applied a deliberate-indifference test in non-
emergency situations. See, e.g., Estate of Owensby v. City of Cincinnati, 414 F.3d 596, 602–03 (6th
Cir. 2005) (applying the deliberate-indifference test to a pretrial detainee’s claim that he was denied
adequate medical care); Bradich v. City of Chicago, 413 F.3d 688, 690–92 (7th Cir. 2005) (denying
defendants summary judgment regarding claims that members of jail staff acted with deliberate
indifference in failing to seek outside assistance for ten minutes after finding an arrestee hanging
in a jail cell); Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 380
F.3d 872, 880–81 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that although the deliberate-indifference standard
requires that officials consciously disregard a known and excessive risk to a victim’s health and
safety, officials need not be warned of a specific danger provided they know of facts from which
an inference can be drawn that substantial risk of harm exists); Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 718–19
(8th Cir. 2004) (holding that the plaintiff’s evidence might demonstrate that prison officials had
actual knowledge that the plaintiff had completed his sentence and yet acted with deliberate
indifference by ignoring or reprimanding him when he tried to bring his sentence order to their
attention); A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 579–81 (3d Cir.
2004) (holding that the deliberate-indifference, rather than the malicious-and-sadistic, standard
applies to a claim brought by a detainee at a county juvenile detention center, alleging that the
center failed to prevent assaults by other residents during a five-week period); Nicini v. Morra, 212
F.3d 798, 810–11, 812 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (recognizing that where a social worker has time
to make unhurried judgments, decisions made with deliberate indifference to individual rights could
shock the conscience but holding that the defendant’s conduct did not rise to that level); Payne ex
rel. Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1040–42 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that, although Lewis
rejected negligence as a standard, deliberate indifference should be employed whenever actual
deliberation is practical); cf. Shieber v. City of Phila., 320 F.3d 409, 419 (3d Cir. 2003) (reasoning
that a higher culpability standard applies both when a state actor must act in haste and under
pressure, and when the state actor must “judg[e] between competing, legitimate interests”);
Cummings v. McIntire, 271 F.3d 341, 345–46 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that a police officer’s
unprovoked and angry shove of a person who asked for directions while the officer was directing
traffic, resulting in severe spinal injury, did not shock the conscience because, even if the officer
unnecessarily used physical force, he did not do so maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of
causing harm; finding that these facts fell within a middle ground “neither so tense and rapidly
evolving as a high-speed police pursuit nor so unhurried and predictable as the ordinary custodial
situation”).
that the deputy acted with “intent to harm,” they failed to meet the shocks-
the-conscience test.  Although reaffirming Rochin’s stringent shocks-the-75
conscience standard, this holding also clarified that a “deliberate
indifference” test should govern claims alleging abuse of executive power
in a non-emergency situation.76
Outside the law enforcement context, the Supreme Court has also
recognized a limited right to bring substantive due process challenges to
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77. 440 U.S. 194 (1979). 
78. Id. at 198–99.
79. Id. at 198. The Court reasoned that the employee could not show that there was “no
rational connection between the [school board’s] action and its conceded interest in providing its
students with competent, well-trained teachers.” Id. The Court has also recognized substantive due
process as prohibiting arbitrary interference with a continuing employment relationship. See, e.g.,
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240 (1988) (finding that the FDIC’s suspension
of an indicted bank president did not arbitrarily interfere with an employment property right
protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492,
508 (1959) (reversing the revocation of a government contractor’s security clearance on grounds
that neither the President nor Congress authorized deprivation of confrontation and cross-
examination rights for appeal hearing).
80. 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977).
81. Id.
82. 435 U.S. 78, 91–92 (1978).
83. 474 U.S. 214, 223 (1985). 
84. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 92; Ewing, 474 U.S. at 227–28.
85. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 92; Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225.
86. Applying the analysis adopted in Youngberg, see supra note 65 and accompanying text,
the Court in Ewing determined that the decision was not a “substantial departure from accepted
academic norms [demonstrating] that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise
professional judgment.” 474 U.S. at 225. The Court stated that so long as the dismissal was
supported by a reason “not beyond the pale of reasoned academic decision-making,” no substantive
due process violation would be found. Id. at 227–28.
arbitrary employment and educational decisions. In Harrah Independent
School District v. Martin,  the Court conceded that, unlike freedom of77
choice in areas of family, marriage, and procreation, employment is not a
fundamental right.  Thus, rather than applying strict scrutiny, courts78
should analyze a school board’s employment decisions under the
traditional “arbitrary and capricious” standard.  In the area of education,79
the Court has ruled that corporal punishment or other disciplinary action
may be so severe or so inspired by malice that the action violates
substantive due process. Although the Court rejected the procedural due
process claim brought in Ingraham ex rel. Ingraham v. Wright,  the Court80
nonetheless recognized that imposition of corporal punishment by a public
school deprives the student of liberty.  Similarly, in Board of Curators v.81
Horowitz  and Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing,  the Court82 83
assumed, without deciding, that students have a constitutionally protected
property interest in their continued enrollment in a university and that
federal courts can review academic decisions under a substantive due
process standard. Although the Court in both cases determined that the
dismissals were not the product of arbitrary action  and cautioned courts84
to be especially wary in using substantive due process to invalidate
academic decisions,  the Court nonetheless recognized that substantive85
due process protects against raw abuse of government power.86
The Supreme Court has also recognized that substantive due process
protects property rights. More specifically, in 1926, in Village of Euclid v.
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87. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
88. Id. at 395.
89. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
90. Id. at 188–89 (citing Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. at 395) (“[G]overnmental power to
interfere by zoning regulations with the general rights of the land owner . . . is not
unlimited . . . . [Where police power justification] is wanting, the action of the zoning
authorities . . . cannot be sustained.”).
91. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980) (rejecting a due process claim
brought by the estate of a fifteen-year-old girl who was tortured and murdered by a parolee five
months after his release from prison).
92. Compare Youngberg v. Romeo ex rel. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982), wherein the
defendant state officials conceded that the state must provide adequate medical care to involuntarily
committed state hospital patients. As stated in Lewis, “The combination of a patient’s involuntary
commitment and his total dependence on his custodians obliges the government to take thought and
make reasonable provision for the patient’s welfare.” 523 U.S. 833, 852 n.12 (1998).
93. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
94. Id. at 191.
Ambler Realty Co.,  the Court held that government action affecting real87
property violates substantive due process if such action is “clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare.”  Subsequently, in Nectow v.88
City of Cambridge,  the Court invalidated a zoning ordinance that did not89
bear a substantial relation to public health, safety, and morals, thereby
unjustifiably invading protected property rights.  This standard came to90
provide the governing principle regarding challenges to zoning and
building permits.
In all these cases the Supreme Court recognized that substantive due
process serves as a check on executive power, even though litigants must
prove an egregious violation to succeed. Demanding that a defendant’s
conduct “shock the conscience” imposes a high threshold for parties who
challenge misuse of government power. This high threshold, however, is
not the only restraint that the Court has imposed on litigants who claim
that government officials have arbitrarily deprived the litigants of their
life, liberty, or property. The Court has also established that the Due
Process Clause does not mandate any type of affirmative duty for the
government to provide services or to protect citizens from the tortious acts
of others.  Unless the government significantly limits the individual’s91
freedom or impairs his or her ability to act, no constitutional requirement
to care and protect will be found.92
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services  best93
illustrates the Supreme Court’s refusal to hold government officials liable
on a “failure to act” theory. The Court rejected a substantive due process
claim brought against county welfare department employees for failing to
intervene to protect a young child from the risk of abuse by his father.94
Although the child’s caseworkers knew that he had been hospitalized
several times for injuries inflicted by a brutal father, the Court held that a
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95. Id. at 197.
96. Id. at 201.
97. Id. This narrow view of the Constitution has been challenged by many constitutional
scholars. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271,
2273 (1990) (arguing that when “conclusory incantation[s]”—such as “[g]overnment inaction is
not actionable”—allow “so many harms to flourish unchecked by the Constitution,” then “the
language, and the concepts it describes, must be scrutinized with care”); Laura Oren, Some
Thoughts on the State-Created Danger Doctrine: DeShaney Is Still Wrong and Castle Rock Is More
of the Same, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 47 (2006) (discussing the distinction between
passivity and action that underlies the state-created danger doctrine).
98. The third restriction may mean no remedy at all because, for example, the Eighth
Amendment test for recovery is likely more stringent than that governing substantive due process.
See infra Part IV.B (discussing rights of pretrial detainees). On the other hand, the reasonableness
standard imposed by the Fourth Amendment might prove to be equally if not more protective. See
infra Part IV.C (discussing rights of students).
state’s “failure to protect an individual against private violence simply
does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.”  The Court95
reasoned that unless government officials, by an affirmative exercise of
power, restrain an individual’s liberty, rendering him unable to protect
himself, there is no cause of action under the Due Process Clause.  Even96
if the state knew the dangers faced by the child, the Court asserted that the
state did not create the danger or render the child more vulnerable to any
danger.  Thus, no matter how arbitrary or capricious the welfare97
department employees’ omissions appeared, no federal guarantee was
implicated. Although DeShaney severely restricts due process by
protecting only those whom the state actually takes into custody or those
whose situation has been rendered more dangerous by government
intervention, DeShaney does not affect claims of harm that are more
directly attributable to government misconduct.
In short, during the past few decades, the Supreme Court, while
recognizing substantive due process as a limitation on executive power,
has placed significant obstacles in the path of plaintiffs seeking to impose
government liability for substantive due process violations. The Court’s
precedents indicate that substantive due process challenges to government
misconduct will be rejected (1) where the action fails to meet the shocks-
the-conscience standard, (2) where plaintiffs seek to hold the government
liable for failing to protect against private violence in the absence of a
special custodial relationship or a situation where government officials
created or exacerbated the danger, or (3) where the claim falls under a
more explicit constitutional guarantee, such as the Fourth or Eighth
Amendment.98
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99. See infra Part III.A.
100. See infra Part III.B.
101. See infra Part III.C.
102. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
103. See Karen M. Blum, DeShaney: Custody, Creation of Danger, and Culpability, 27 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 435, 471 (1994) (noting the lack of a clear consensus about the criteria for defining
when a constitutional duty arises, the meaning of “in custody” and “state-created danger,” and the
difference between “sins of omission or commission”).
104. See Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d 68, 71–73 (1st Cir. 1999) (recognizing that the
circuits have uniformly rejected the argument that compulsory school attendance laws create a duty
III.  SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO EXECUTIVE
     ACTION IN THE LOWER COURTS: FURTHER OBSTACLES
                      AND CONFUSION                
The federal appellate courts have been increasingly unreceptive to
substantive due process challenges to executive misconduct. Some have
extended the Supreme Court’s DeShaney decision to deny relief in failure-
to-act cases by narrowly construing the concept of a custodial relationship,
or by rejecting or severely limiting the danger-creation theory.  In99
addition, many appellate courts have imposed their own impediments on
plaintiffs seeking to bring substantive due process claims by extracting
snippets from Supreme Court dicta or statements made in concurring
opinions. For example, some circuits have misconstrued Supreme Court
precedent as foreclosing substantive due process claims unless the claim
identifies a fundamental right.  Other circuits have rejected claims100
involving only property, or they have inappropriately borrowed from
procedural due process analysis to reject substantive due process claims
where an “adequate state remedy” is available.  This Part discusses these101
approaches to substantive due process and explains why they are ill-
founded.
A.  Expanding DeShaney’s Duty-of-Care Requirement to Insulate
Official Misconduct
As discussed in Part II.C, the Supreme Court has ruled that if a
government official does not place a person in a position of danger, but
merely fails to adequately protect victims as members of the general
public, a substantive due process claim may not proceed. In DeShaney, the
Court explained that unless the government, by an affirmative exercise of
power, restrains an individual’s liberty to protect himself, there is no cause
of action under the Due Process Clause.102
Many lower courts have been reluctant to find the existence of a so-
called “custodial relationship,” which would trigger the duty to protect.103
For example, in the public-school context, most courts have found no duty
to protect students from their classmates despite mandatory education
laws.  Moreover, even in residential school programs, which restrict104
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of care on the part of school authorities); see also Nix v. Franklin County Sch. Dist., 311 F.3d 1373,
1378–79 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 946 (2003); Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195
F.3d 845, 853 (6th Cir. 1999); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412, 1415
(5th Cir. 1997); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1996).
105. Lee v. Pine Bluff Sch. Dist., 472 F.3d 1026, 1030–31 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that school
officials have no duty to protect students participating in voluntary school-related activities, and
thus a parent of a junior-high student who died after falling ill on a school band trip could not
maintain a substantive due process action against the school band director; there was no allegation
that the trip was compulsory or that the student was prohibited from leaving the trip at any time or
that the chaperone denied the student the opportunity to contact her parent, and the state’s
constitutional duty does not arise from its knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its
expression of intent to help him, but only where the state actually limits an individual’s freedom
to act on her own behalf); Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697, 703–04 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that
a disabled student was not in custody for purposes of a claim arising from assault by other students
because the student was voluntarily admitted to school); Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1305
(5th Cir. 1995) (asserting that the state owes no duty to protect students who are voluntarily in the
state’s custodial care, and thus a deaf student in a residential special-education program has no
claim for failure to protect from sexual assault by a classmate).
106. For other examples of courts narrowly construing the custodial-relationship rule, see
Hudson ex rel. Davis v. Hudson, 475 F.3d 741, 745 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a court-issued
protective order did not create a special custodial relationship between the police and the person
who sought protection so as to render the officers liable on a substantive due process theory for her
death, which was allegedly due to non-enforcement of the order); Carver v. City of Cincinnati, 474
F.3d 283, 286 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the fact that the police exercised control over an
environment is alone insufficient to demonstrate that a person is in custody—where officers neither
imposed physical restraint over an unconscious person nor directed any actions toward him when
they secured the area to conduct an investigation into the death of another individual, the custody
exception is inapplicable).
107. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989). 
108. Id. at 203. 
students’ liberty and arguably create a duty to protect, most courts have
held that voluntarily admitted students cannot avail themselves of the
custodial-relationship exception.  Thus, even if a state institution has105
undertaken to care for children, it will not be liable for failing to provide
a safe educational environment despite conduct that demonstrates
deliberate indifference to student welfare.106
In addition to recognizing a duty of care in a custodial setting, the
Supreme Court in DeShaney acknowledged liability under a “danger
creation” theory. The Court explained that the government could not be
liable for a child’s injury because, while the government officials may
have been aware of the dangers he faced, it neither created these dangers
nor did anything to render him more vulnerable to these dangers.  At107
worst, the defendants “stood by and did nothing when suspicious
circumstances dictated a more active role for them.”  Thus, the Court108
clearly suggested that where government officials through their own
affirmative conduct actually create or contribute to the danger, a
constitutional duty to protect is triggered.
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109. Beltran v. City of El Paso, 367 F.3d 299, 307–08 (5th Cir. 2004) (“This court has
consistently refused to recognize a ‘state-created danger’ theory of § 1983 liability . . . .”). But see
Breen v. Tex. A&M Univ., 485 F.3d 325, 336–37 (5th Cir. 2007) (calling the relevant quote in
Beltran dictum and finding that Scanlan v. Texas A&M University, 343 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2003),
had impliedly recognized the state-created danger doctrine as a valid legal theory, and that the
doctrine was the law of the case for the instant set of appeals).
110. See Koulta v. Merciez, 477 F.3d 442, 445–47 (6th Cir. 2007). In Koulta, the court held
that officers who ordered a suspect to immediately leave a homeowner’s property could not be held
liable for the death of a motorist killed in a collision with the suspect even though the suspect was
visibly drunk and the officers failed to administer a breathalyzer test. Id. The plaintiff failed to
show that the officers’ conduct amounted to an affirmative act that increased the danger or that the
conduct specifically placed the deceased at risk, as distinguished from a risk that affected the public
at large. Id. The court ruled that to impose liability under a state-created danger theory, the plaintiff
must show (1) an affirmative act by the state that either created or increased the risk that the
plaintiff would be exposed to harm by a third party, (2) a special danger to the plaintiff as
distinguished from a risk that affects the public at large, and (3) that the official knew or should
have known that his actions specifically endangered the plaintiff. Id. at 445–47. The defendant’s
proclivity to drink and drive had “blossomed long before the officers arrived” on the scene, their
order to the defendant to leave the homeowner’s property immediately did not require the defendant
to drive home if she lacked the capacity to do so. Id. at 446. Because the defendant’s behavior
endangered every driver and passenger on the road that evening, her conduct did not create a risk
that was specific to the deceased. Id. at 447.
See also Johnson v. City of Seattle, 474 F.3d 634, 639–41 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that (1) to
prevail under the danger-creation exception, a plaintiff must show that government officials
affirmatively placed the plaintiff in a position of danger by exposing her to a dangerous situation
that she would not have otherwise faced, (2) the fact that police had a more aggressive operational
plan that might have more effectively controlled crowds at a Mardi Gras celebration does not mean
that alteration of the plan was affirmative conduct that placed the plaintiffs in danger, because it
put plaintiffs in no worse position than had the police not acted at all, and (3) plaintiffs who were
assaulted and injured by a crowd at the celebration could not hold the defendants liable for violating
the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights); Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 506–07
(3d Cir. 2003) (holding that under the state-created danger theory, a plaintiff must prove harm
ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct, and that the defendant’s conduct “shocks the
conscience”); Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 918 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining that to establish
state-created danger, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the state increased the plaintiff’s
vulnerability to the danger; that the plaintiff was a member of a limited and specifically definable
group; that the defendant’s conduct put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious, immediate, and
proximate harm; that the risk was obvious or known; that the defendant acted recklessly in
conscious disregard of that risk; and that such conduct was, “when viewed in total,” conscience-
shocking).
111. See Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that, even
assuming federal officials knowingly misled emergency workers responding to the 9/11 terror
Despite this language, at least one circuit has explicitly rejected the
state-created danger theory, at least in dictum.  Other courts have109
stressed that to recognize a substantive due process claim the harm to
specific victims must be foreseeable and the defendants must recklessly
disregard the danger.  Further, courts have rejected claims based on a110
finding that the danger was not substantial or that government officials did
not act with the requisite level of culpability to meet the shocks-the-
conscience test.  111
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attacks in New York City into forgoing use of respirators that would have prevented lung injuries
from airborne contaminants, the officials cannot be held liable for breach of substantive due process
because their action did not “shock the contemporary conscience”; actionable conduct must be
“brutal and offensive to human dignity”; and liability should not be imposed when government
officials face conflicting obligations and have to make decisions using rapidly changing
information); Coyne v. Cronin, 386 F.3d 280, 287–88 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that because the
plaintiff did not allege that the government agent deliberately exposed his identity and thus
enhanced his danger in the prison community, the substantive due process claim must be
dismissed); Avalos ex rel. Vasquez v. City of Glenwood, 382 F.3d 792, 799–801 (8th Cir. 2004)
(observing that plaintiffs must prove that the defendants acted despite a risk that was known or
obvious, that they acted recklessly in conscious disregard of the risk, and that the conduct shocks
the conscience); Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 773, 775 (7th Cir. 2002) (observing that
although social workers may have been negligent in performing background checks, the plaintiffs
could not establish that the defendants actually knew of or suspected the existence of child abuse
in prospective adoptive family so as to be liable for subsequent abuse), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 908
(2003); Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 508–13 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that police
did not violate the substantive due process rights of a wife and son who were killed by her mentally
deranged husband who armed himself and barricaded his family inside his home despite allegations
that police conduct unnecessarily provoked the husband and escalated the confrontation, because
the officers’ conduct did not shock the conscience); Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137,
1152 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that application of the state-created danger theory in other cases
involved “discrete, grossly reckless acts committed by the state or state actors using their peculiar
positions as state actors, leaving a discrete plaintiff vulnerable to foreseeable injury”).
112. See Blum, supra note 103, at 471; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The State-Created
Danger Doctrine, 23 TOURO L. REV. 1, 15–17 (2007) (discussing the circuit split on formulating
the doctrine). 
113. Currier, 242 F.3d at 918. 
114. The Sixth Circuit has adopted a three-prong test, requiring that a plaintiff assert an
affirmative act by the state that either created or increased the risk that plaintiff would be exposed
to violence by a third party, that the misconduct focused on the plaintiff, as distinguished from a
risk that affects the public at large, and that the state knew or should have known that its actions
specifically endangered the plaintiff. Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685, 690 (6th Cir. 2006). Further,
the Eighth Circuit has come up with a five-prong test requiring plaintiffs to prove that (1) they were
members of a limited, precisely definable group, (2) the government’s conduct put them at
significant risk of serious, immediate, and proximate harm, (3) the risk was obvious or known to
the government, (4) the government acted recklessly in conscious disregard of the risk, and (5) the
government’s conduct shocks the conscience. Hart v. City of Little Rock, 432 F.3d 801, 805 (8th
The refusal of the lower courts to impose liability where government
officials recklessly create or increase the danger to citizens impermissibly
extends DeShaney.  Nonetheless, many courts have fashioned multi-112
pronged tests that render this theory virtually impossible to use. The Tenth
Circuit, for example, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate not only that the
state increased the plaintiff’s vulnerability to the danger but also that the
plaintiff was a member of a limited and specifically definable group; that
the defendant’s conduct put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious,
immediate, and proximate harm; that the risk was obvious or known; that
the defendant acted recklessly in conscious disregard to that risk; and that
the conduct was conscience-shocking.  Other circuits have adopted113
similar multi-pronged tests.114
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Cir. 2005).
115. See, e.g., Ye v. United States, 484 F.3d 634, 642–43 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that
assurances made by a doctor at a city-run health clinic that a patient was fine and had nothing to
worry about made the patient more vulnerable to danger because the patient’s son testified that he
would have taken his father to the emergency room but for such assurances; however, mere
assurances do not constitute affirmative action necessary to form the basis of a state-created danger
claim); D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1373–76
(3d Cir. 1992) (finding that plaintiff school children could not hold the school liable for sexual
assaults by other students because the conduct of school officials—which included failure to assign
an experienced teacher to the classroom, failure to supervise the classroom, failure to investigate,
and failure to report abuse to parents or other authorities—constituted only “indefensible passivity,”
and “nonfeasance . . . do[es] not rise to the level of a constitutional violation”).
116. 478 F.3d 869, 871–72 (8th Cir. 2007). 
117. Id. at 871.
118. Id. at 872.
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 875. In addition, the court determined that no fundamental right was implicated
because the surveillance of the house and the unwarranted direction of suspicion toward this
household did not deprive the occupants of any “unenumerated constitutional right to ‘personal
safety’ recognized by our Nation’s history and traditions.” Id. at 873. Part III.B critiques this
fundamental-rights requirement.
In light of these draconian tests, unsurprisingly, courts often reject
claims on summary judgment despite compelling factual circumstances.115
For example, in Flowers v. City of Minneapolis,  a police lieutenant116
targeted an African-American family that rented a home in his
neighborhood. The lieutenant learned that the new neighbor had been
arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, and the lieutenant
suspected that one of the members of the family might be a gang
member.  On the lieutenant’s own initiative, he distributed the arrest117
record to patrol officers and offered a steak dinner for any officer who
made an arrest that led to the conviction or eviction of anyone living at the
residence.  As a result of this edict, passing cruisers shined lights into the118
plaintiff’s home and frightened his family for about a month, a window
was broken at the home shortly after a police squad car was seen driving
by, and the family lost business at its daycare center.  The directed patrol119
did not end until the plaintiff sued the department. The Eighth Circuit
nonetheless reasoned that the plaintiff could not pursue his claim because,
although the directed patrols may have constituted harassment, they did
not put the family in danger of significant harm.  This incident reflects120
egregious abuse of official power and deliberate indifference to individual
rights—causing a family a month-long nightmare of police
harassment—and yet the court found the claims were not actionable under
substantive due process. 
These appellate court decisions fail to distinguish between affirmative
acts of government officials that create or exacerbate a dangerous
situation, and cases truly founded on a mere failure to act. For example,
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121. See id. at 871–75; cf. Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 79–82 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding
that although EPA officials had no affirmative duty to protect 9/11 workers who performed search-
and-rescue tasks from exposure to environmental contaminants, allegations that defendants assured
site workers that the air in Lower Manhattan was safe to breathe, thereby creating a false sense of
security that induced them to forgo protective gear, might be actionable under the danger-creation
theory).
122. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849–50 (1998).
123. See, e.g., Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 918 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a social
worker who transferred custody of a child from the mother to the father, who subsequently killed
the child, could be held liable under the state-created danger theory because the child would not
have been exposed to danger but for the affirmative acts of the social worker); Munger v. City of
Glasgow Police Dep’t, 227 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that police officers who
kicked a man out of a bar and took away his keys could be held liable when the man died of
hypothermia); Davis v. Brady, 143 F.3d 1021, 1027 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that police who took
away a driver’s keys and left him on the side of the road in a dark area could be held liable for
injuries he subsequently suffered when a vehicle struck him); Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist.,
132 F.3d 902, 915 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he dispositive factor appears to be whether the state has in
some way placed the plaintiff in a dangerous position that was foreseeable, and not whether the act
was more appropriately characterized as an affirmative act or an omission.”).
124. See Lupu, supra note 26, at 1030 (“Most liberties lacking textual support are of the
garden variety—like liberty of contract—and thus their deprivation is constitutional if rationally
necessary to the achievement of a public good. Several select liberties, on the other hand, have
attained the status of ‘fundamental’ or ‘preferred,’ with the consequence that the Constitution
permits a state to abridge them only if it can demonstrate an extraordinary justification.”).
125. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
where a lieutenant invites police officers to target an African-American
family that has moved into his neighborhood and the harassment is
perpetrated by police officers acting “under color of state law,” reliance on
DeShaney is clearly misplaced: The deprivation of liberty was caused only
by government officials’ affirmative acts, not private wrongdoers.121
Further, although the Supreme Court in Lewis confirmed that a plaintiff
must satisfy a shocks-the-conscience test in substantive due process
challenges to abuse of executive power, the Court explained that
government officials “shock[] the conscience” when they have the
opportunity to reflect and yet act with deliberate indifference to the rights
of citizens.  Outside the emergency context of high-speed chases or122
prison riots, courts should apply a meaningful deliberate-indifference
standard to effectively restrain arbitrary, unreasonable government
misconduct.123
B.  Limiting Substantive Due Process Claims to Those Involving  
Fundamental Rights
As discussed in Part II.A, the Supreme Court—in analyzing substantive
due process challenges to legislation—generally asks whether a
fundamental right is implicated because the answer to this question
determines the appropriate standard of review.  For example, in124
Washington v. Glucksberg,  the Court described the “threshold125
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126. Id. at 722. The Court noted that the fundamental right or liberty interest had to be
objectively “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,’” and that the case had to provide a “‘careful description’ of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest.” Id. at 720–21 (citations omitted) (quoting Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977), Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled
by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), and Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
127. See supra notes 36–45 and accompanying text.
128. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
129. See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
130. See Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 337 F.3d 1091, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects individuals from state action that either ‘shocks the
conscience’ or interferes with rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” (citation omitted)
(quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), and Palko, 302 U.S. at 325)); Singleton
v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419, 425 (8th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that the plaintiff may establish a substantive
due process violation either by proving deprivation of a liberty interest or by asserting that the
government’s actions shocked the conscience); Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1991)
(“The Supreme Court has enunciated two alternative tests by which substantive due process is
examined. Under the first theory, it is not required that the plaintiffs prove a violation of a specific
liberty or property interest; however, the state’s conduct must be such that it ‘shocks the
conscience.’”); see also Patricia C. Cecil, Case Note, Section 1983 and State Postdeprivation
Remedy for Liberty Loss: Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985), 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 257,
262 (1986) (commenting that a substantive due process claim “derives validity from showing either
a violation of the Bill of Rights or a demonstration of egregious conduct by a state actor”).
requirement—that a challenged state action implicate a fundamental
right—before requiring more than a reasonable relation to a legitimate
state interest to justify the action.”  However, the Court has not always126
followed this strict analysis, as reflected in cases such as Lawrence and
Casey, where admittedly heightened scrutiny was applied despite the
Court’s failure to identify a fundamental right.  More significantly for127
this discussion, the Court has never ruled that the absence of a
fundamental right ends the constitutional inquiry. As Glucksberg
explained, this simply means that government action will be tested by a
lower level of scrutiny.  128
With regard to claims of executive misconduct, the Supreme Court
never clearly articulated the fundamental-rights approach. Although forced
stomach-pumping arguably involves the core liberty interest of bodily
integrity, the Court in Rochin invoked the shocks-the-conscience test
without first identifying a fundamental right.  Indeed, the Court did not129
mandate that any “liberty” or “property” interest first be identified, and
some courts read the decision to permit plaintiffs to establish a substantive
due process violation either by proving violation of a specific liberty or
property interest or by showing that the state’s conduct “shocks the
conscience.”  Obviously, the importance of the right will inform the130
shocks-the-conscience test because the deprivation of fundamental liberty
interests will be more likely to upset our sensibilities. Nonetheless, the
Court has never ruled that without a fundamental right all judicial inquiry
must cease.
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131. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
132. Id. at 846 (citations omitted). In contrast, Justice Scalia commented that he did not
understand why substantive due process “protects some liberties against executive officers but not
against legislatures.” Id. at 862 n.2 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring); see also Robert
Chesney, Old Wine or New? The Shocks-the-Conscience Standard and the Distinction Between
Legislative and Executive Action, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 981, 1003–17 (2000) (contending that
there are no viable constitutional or prudential reasons for treating legislative and executive
challenges differently).
133. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846.
134. Id. at 847 n.8; see also Christensen v. County of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 462 n.2 (7th Cir.
2007) (explaining that when a plaintiff complains of abuse of executive power, the “‘conscience
shocking’” test determines liability, rather than the traditional strict scrutiny standard used to
measure the constitutionality of legislative acts; thus, even if a fundamental right is identified and
has been impaired, a court must then determine whether the governmental action can be
characterized as arbitrary or conscience-shocking in a constitutional sense); DePoutot v. Raffaelly,
424 F.3d 112, 118 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[T]he question of whether the challenged conduct shocks the
One year after Glucksberg, the confusion in this area was fueled by the
Supreme Court’s analysis in County of Sacramento v. Lewis.  Justice131
Souter’s opinion stated that the criteria for judging a substantive due
process claim differ depending on whether the plaintiff challenges
executive or legislative action: “While due process protection in the
substantive sense limits what the government may do in both its legislative
and its executive capacities, criteria to identify what is fatally arbitrary
differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a
governmental officer that is at issue.”  Justice Souter recognized the132
inherent conflict between Glucksberg, which begins its analysis by asking
whether a fundamental right is implicated, and the analysis in Lewis,
which asks whether misconduct shocks the conscience.  Specifically, he133
explains in a footnote:
[E]xecutive action challenges raise a particular need to
preserve the constitutional proportions of constitutional
claims, lest the Constitution be demoted to what we have
called a font of tort law. Thus, in a due process challenge to
executive action, the threshold question is whether the
behavior of the government officer is so egregious, so
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the
contemporary conscience. That judgment may be informed
by a history of liberty protection, but it necessarily reflects an
understanding of traditional executive behavior, of
contemporary practice, and of the standards of blame
generally applied to them. Only if the necessary condition of
egregious behavior were satisfied would there be a possibility
of recognizing a substantive due process right to be free of
such executive action, and only then might there be a debate
about the sufficiency of historical examples of enforcement
of the right claimed, or its recognition in other ways.134
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contemporary conscience is a threshold matter that must be resolved before a constitutional right
to be free from such conduct can be recognized.”); Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir.
2004) (noting that courts must ask the threshold question whether the government’s action shocks
the conscience); United States v. Al-Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 574 (4th Cir. 2004) (asserting that the
first inquiry is whether the action shocks the conscience, and if it does not, there is no need to
inquire into the “‘nature of the asserted liberty interest’” (quoting Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d
732, 738 (4th Cir. 1999)); Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 510 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the initial inquiry in a case concerning executive misconduct must be whether the
alleged action is conscience-shocking).
135. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 858.
138. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
139. Id. at 722.
Justice Souter argued that the test for executive misconduct must be
particularly stringent to prevent litigants from converting all torts into
constitutional torts. Thus, he imposed a threshold test of egregious
misbehavior. His footnote, however, cannot be interpreted to mean that
absent a fundamental right egregious behavior can never be conscience-
shocking. Justice Kennedy, with Justice O’Connor, in their concurring
opinion in Lewis, acknowledged that the challenged action implicated an
explicit fundamental liberty interest because a life was lost.  Then they135
asserted that the shocks-the-conscience test “can be used to mark the
beginning point in asking whether or not the objective character of certain
conduct is consistent with our traditions, precedents, and historical
understanding of the Constitution and its meaning.”  Thus, regardless of136
whether a plaintiff challenges legislative or executive action, “objective
considerations, including history and precedent, are the controlling
principle.”  137
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion seeks to incorporate
Glucksberg’s historical approach, which determines whether a statute’s
interference with a nontextual liberty interest is “‘so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,’”
thus triggering strict review of the legislative enactment.  However, the138
requirement that history and precedent be consulted in assessing whether
government conduct shocks the conscience does not mean that only the
deprivation of a right specifically designated by the Court as fundamental
is actionable under substantive due process. Glucksberg recognized that
the Due Process Clause also prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of non-
fundamental liberty interests.139
The various opinions in Lewis have led lower courts to disagree about
whether the shocks-the-conscience standard replaces the fundamental-
rights analysis set forth in Glucksberg when executive action is
challenged, or whether the standard supplements the historical inquiry into
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140. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 857–58 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see Bonebrake v. Norris, 417 F.3d
938, 943 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that the shocks-the-conscience determination “should be answered
in light of ‘an understanding of traditional executive behavior, of contemporary practice, and of the
standards of blame generally applied to them,’” and only then should the court analyze the right at
issue (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8)); Galdikas v. Fagan, 342 F.3d 684, 690 n.3 (7th Cir.
2003) (“The principal ambiguity is whether the ‘shocks the conscience’ standard replaces the
fundamental rights analysis set forth in Glucksberg whenever executive conduct is challenged or
whether the ‘shocks the conscience’ standard supplements or informs the Glucksberg paradigm in
such situations.”), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1183 (2004), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v.
Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 941–42 (7th Cir. 2004); Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 739 n.1 (4th Cir.
1999) (commenting that while Justice Souter was unclear whether the shocks-the-conscience test
should be employed without consideration of the history and tradition of the right involved, Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence more appropriately teaches that “courts seeking faithfully to apply the
Lewis methodology in executive-act cases properly may look to history for revelations about
traditional executive practices and judicial responses in comparable situations by way of
establishing context for assessing the conduct at issue”).
141. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–74 (1952); Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846–47; see
also Chesney, supra note 132, at 999 (opining that Justice Souter’s footnote 8 implies that
Glucksberg’s “requirements of a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental right and a
demonstration that the right is grounded in past practice, does not necessarily control the next stage
of the analysis of a substantive due process challenge to execution action” (footnote omitted)).
Notably, some courts have interpreted Rochin as enunciating an alternative test whereby substantive
due process violations are established whenever a plaintiff proves that the state’s conduct “shocks
the conscience.” Under this view, it is not necessary to identify any property or liberty interest,
much less a fundamental right, provided that the government misconduct shocks the conscience.
See cases cited supra note 130; cf. Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 738 (discussing the various opinions in the
Lewis case and concluding that after a plaintiff meets the threshold test of culpability, the “inquiry
must turn to the nature of the asserted interest, hence to the level of protection to which it is
entitled”).
142. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 862 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]t is a puzzlement why
substantive due process protects some liberties against executive officers but not against
legislatures.”); cf. The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 122, 202
(1998) (“[T]his position seems flatly inconsistent with the majority’s assertion in footnote 8 that
fulfilling ‘the necessary condition’ of egregious, conscience-shocking behavior is a hurdle that
litigants must overcome before even beginning the Glucksberg inquiry. Perhaps Justice Scalia
believes that the ‘threshold question’ of egregiousness will overwhelm any consideration of the
the nature of the asserted liberty interest, as Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence suggests.  Under Justice Souter’s approach, the question140
whether particular behavior shocks the conscience would depend in part
on a historical review of traditional executive practices. However, once
executive misconduct shocks the conscience, a violation of substantive due
process has occurred and further inquiry into the fundamental nature of the
right is unnecessary. This was the analysis in Rochin, which Justice Souter
affirmed as still-controlling precedent.  Indeed, in his concurring141
opinion, Justice Scalia opined that Justice Souter’s approach will result in
greater, not lesser, substantive due process protection against the actions
of executive officers than against the actions of legislatures, apparently
because Justice Souter’s analysis abandoned the strict fundamental-rights
approach articulated in Glucksberg.142
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historical inquiry, and that courts interpreting Lewis will assume that any egregious, conscience-
shocking executive conduct also violates a historically rooted right.”).
143. See, e.g., Khan v. Gallitano, 180 F.3d 829, 834–36 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that Lewis’s
shocks-the-conscience standard applies only in special circumstances comparable to the high-speed
chase at issue there and that fundamental-rights analysis alone governs other substantive due
process challenges to executive action; thus, an attorney had no substantive due process right to be
free from tortious interference in her contract with clients by village officials because such a right
was not a fundamental one deeply rooted in history and tradition); see also Christensen v. County
of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that a couple who alleged they were stalked
and trailed by an officer in his squad car as a result of a personal vendetta could not establish a
substantive due process violation unless they identified a fundamental right, proved that the
government interfered directly and substantially with that right, and that the deprivation was
conscience-shocking in a constitutional sense); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 478 F.3d 869,
872–74 (8th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that a police lieutenant’s conduct in directing his officers to
conduct a month-long patrol of a residence and routine spotlighting did not violate substantive due
process absent a showing that this misconduct violated a fundamental constitutional right and that
the conduct shocked the “contemporary conscience”); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225,
234 n.12 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a plaintiff who alleged constructive discharge and injury to
future ability to earn a living failed to state a substantive due process claim because he did not
establish a fundamental property or liberty right); Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 33–34 (1st
Cir. 2005) (holding that to establish a substantive due process claim, it is not enough to assert that
government action shocked the conscience when the plaintiff has failed to meet the threshold
requirement of identifying a fundamental right at issue); Slusarchuk v. Hoff, 346 F.3d 1178,
1181–82 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that the district court erred in asserting that substantive due
process liability may be imposed either where there is “an abuse of government power ‘that shocks
the conscience’” or where there is an interference with “‘rights implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty’”; rather, “this court sitting en banc held that a substantive due process plaintiff ‘must
demonstrate both that the official’s conduct was conscience-shocking, and that the official violated
one or more fundamental rights that are deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’” (quoting the district court opinion and Moran v. Clarke,
296 F.3d 638, 651 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Bye, J., concurring))), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 988
(2004); Gikas v. Wash. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 731, 735–37 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that in the Third
Circuit only  “fundamental” property interests trigger substantive due process protection); Wozniak
v. Conry, 236 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that substantive due process applies only to
decisions affecting fundamental rights, and that the complaining professor lacked a fundamental
right to teach without following a university’s grading curve); C.B. ex rel. Breeding v. Driscoll, 82
F.3d 383, 387 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that a student suspended for alleged inappropriate behavior
in school cannot assert a claim for substantive due process because the right to attend public school
is not fundamental and noting that the Eleventh Circuit has held that executive action contravenes
substantive due process only if the right is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”); LRL Props.
v. Portage Metro Hous. Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1111 (6th Cir. 1995) (asserting that substantive due
process is simply “‘not concerned with the garden variety issues of common law contract’” and that
the “right to participate in a federal housing funds program simply does not rise to the level of a
right ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience . . . as to be ranked as fundamental’” (quoting
Sutton v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 958 F.2d 1339, 1350–51 (6th Cir. 1992))); Newman v. Burgin,
Regardless of how one views the debate between Justice Souter and
Justice Kennedy, neither of the opinions asserts that absent identification
of a fundamental right, substantive due process cannot be invoked to
challenge abuses of power by the executive branch. Nonetheless, many
lower courts have misconstrued these cases to mandate this requirement.143
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930 F.2d 955, 961–62 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[U]nless a fundamental liberty protected elsewhere in the
Constitution . . . is at stake, the primary concern of the due process clause is procedure, not the
substantive merits of a decision.”); Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986) (“Rights
of substantive due process are founded not upon state provisions but upon deeply rooted notions
of fundamental personal interests derived from the Constitution.”).
144. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728. Even Justice Scalia, an outspoken critic of substantive
due process, acknowledged that laws that do not implicate a fundamental right are subject to “the
ordinary ‘rational relationship’ test.” See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989); see
also Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 457 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that
“substantive due process has been held to protect a broad sphere of ‘harmless liberties’ (as well as
fundamental rights)”).
145. Nonetheless, this standard may be met as reflected in the Court’s holding in Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). See supra text accompanying notes 44–45.
146. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847.
147. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 216 (contending that “questions about unenumerated rights
are questions about the level of abstraction on which we are to understand constitutional language”
and that “there is no analytic basis for selecting one rather than another level of generality or
specificity”); see also Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition
of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) (“The selection of a level of generality necessarily
involves value choices.”).
148. 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989).
149. Id. at 124–27.
Admittedly, in Glucksberg the Court held that only the deprivation of a
fundamental right will trigger strict scrutiny of a legislative enactment.
However, even absent a fundamental right, courts will analyze federal and
state laws to ensure that the laws are neither arbitrary nor capricious.144
Arguably the standard is very deferential, and a plaintiff will have
difficulty proving that a legislative body knowingly and deliberately
enacted an arbitrary, capricious provision.  The possibility for arbitrary145
action by executive branch officials, however, is much more likely,
resulting in the concern that substantive due process challenges may be
regularly brought whenever government officials misbehave. Recognizing
this concern, the Lewis Court imposed a high threshold level of culpability
but did not alter Rochin’s holding that conscience-shocking executive
misconduct violates substantive due process.  146
Interpreting substantive due process to protect only fundamental rights
is misguided for several reasons. First, this interpretation allows courts to
dismiss claims involving liberty depending upon how broadly or narrowly
the liberty claim is characterized. Many have recognized this problem in
challenges to legislative enactments.  For example, in Michael H. v.147
Gerald D.,  a biological father challenged California’s law that created148
an irrebuttable presumption that a married woman’s husband was the
father of the child. The Court ruled that a biological father who had
established a relationship with the child had no right to a hearing to
determine paternity and that he could be denied all parental rights.149
Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued that it was well established that fathers
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150. Id. at 141–45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 127 (majority opinion).
152. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 856 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 862–63 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 836 (majority opinion)).
154. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (“We must therefore
‘exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field,’ lest the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the
Members of this Court.” (citation omitted) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
502 (1977))).
155. See supra notes 36–45 and accompanying text.
156. 478 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2007).
157. Id. at 874 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). The plaintiff
contended that a police lieutenant who directed officers to direct a month-long patrol outside his
residence caused a slow down in his child care business in violation of his substantive due process
right to earn a livelihood. Although recognizing a fundamental right to engage in one’s chosen
occupation, the court found that the temporary interference did not rise to the level of a deprivation
of this fundamental right. Id. at 874; see also infra note 235.
have a fundamental interest in their biological children.  Justice Scalia,150
however, asserted that the specific liberty interest implicated was the
alleged right of a father to a child who is conceived as a result of an
adulterous relationship with a married woman—a right that has not
traditionally been recognized and thus cannot be viewed as fundamental.151
The same characterization problem surfaced in Lewis in the context of
deprivations of life, liberty, and property, by executive officials. The right
at stake in Lewis, where officers killed a youth on a motorcycle during a
high-speed chase, could be defined broadly as implicating the fundamental
right to life, as Justice Kennedy did,  or, more narrowly, as a “right to be152
free from ‘deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high-speed
automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender,’” which
Justice Scalia found not to be rooted in history or tradition and thus not
protected under substantive due process.153
In addition to characterization problems, the fundamental-rights
approach causes trouble because it requires courts to assess which
nontextual interests should be viewed as “super protected.” Because the
legislature can almost never justify depriving such rights, the Supreme
Court has been wary about recognizing new fundamental interests.  In154
fact, it has narrowed its protection of previously recognized fundamental
rights.  The difficulty of identifying exactly what rights enjoy this status155
is reflected in many appellate court decisions. For example, in Flowers v.
City of Minneapolis,  the Eighth Circuit, which follows the fundamental-156
rights approach, asserted that the right to engage in “‘the common
occupations of life’” is a fundamental right, at least if one has been
completely prohibited from engaging in a calling.  In the post-Lochner157
world, most courts would not view this right as fundamental for purposes
of challenging legislation, although this right would be considered a
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158. Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999) (recognizing that the Liberty Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment protects a generalized right to choose one’s occupation, although noting
that the right is subject to reasonable government regulation).
159. Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Lewis attacked the notion that “substantive due process
protects some liberties against executive officers but not against legislatures.” County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 861 n.2 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
160. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
161. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted in Moore v. City
of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion). Ironically, some of the appellate
courts that have limited challenges to executive action to those involving fundamental rights have
then broadly construed the meaning of a fundamental right. See Flowers v. City of Minneapolis,
478 F.3d 869, 874 (8th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging a “fundamental right to engage in one’s chosen
occupation”).
162. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
163. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
164. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s failure to articulate any
standard of review). 
165. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
166. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. Justice Kennedy asserted that “[l]iberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct.” Id. at 562.
167. Id. at 571–72. Although Justice Kennedy went to great length to rebut the argument that
protected liberty interest for purposes of procedural due process.  The158
point is that superimposition of a fundamental-rights threshold question
simply adds uncertainty and confusion to the inquiry.159
Critical to this discussion is the principle that even without a
fundamental right, substantive due process limits legislative and executive
action. The Fourteenth Amendment does not say that government cannot
deprive persons of a “fundamental right”; rather, it prohibits all
deprivations of “life, liberty and property, without due process of law.”160
Further, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the scope of “liberty”
protected by the Due Process Clause is broad: “[A] rational continuum
which . . . includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions
and purposeless restraints . . . .”161
The Court has never repudiated the broad definition of “liberty” first
enunciated during the Lochner period as encompassing a wide range of
interests “recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.”  The Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas162 163
implicitly recognizes this “continuum approach.” The majority refused to
follow the strict fundamental-rights analysis that the Court had enunciated
in Glucksberg.  Lawrence is noteworthy because generally where no164
fundamental right is implicated, legislative enactments are presumed valid
and will be struck down only if totally arbitrary and capricious.165
Nonetheless, the Court invalidated Texas’s sodomy law as arbitrarily
interfering with the liberty interests of individuals to enter into personal
relationships,  and the Court rejected the notion that substantive due166
process requires a specific basis in tradition.167
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there was a tradition to outlaw homosexual sodomy, id. at 568–71, ultimately he concluded that an
examination of history and tradition is not the exclusive criterion for recognizing liberty interests,
id. at 572 (“‘[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the
substantive due process inquiry.’” (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring))); see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
269–79 (1990); Conkle, supra note 2, at 67–68 (arguing that substantive due process should not be
confined to historical liberties but, rather, as suggested in Lawrence, should include protection of
all rights that are supported by an objective determination of contemporary national values).
168. See Conkle, supra note 2, at 65 (contending that Lawrence “includes untapped
insights . . . that might inform a substantial reconceptualization and reformation of substantive due
process”); Magarian, supra note 5, at 285 (“Lawrence dramatically shifted the tide, reinvigorating
substantive due process both by sharpening the doctrine’s affirmative rationale and by tightening
the restrictions it imposes on government regulation.”); see also Randy E. Barnett, Justice
Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2002–2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 41
(2003) (recognizing Lawrence as a case adopting a libertarian interpretation of the Constitution that
creates a “presumption of liberty” whereby all laws that restrict “liberty” are presumptively
unconstitutional); Lino A. Graglia, Lawrence v. Texas: Our Philosopher-Kings Adopt
Libertarianism as Our Official National Philosophy and Reject Traditional Morality as a Basis for
Law, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1149–50 (2004) (criticizing Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Lawrence
as writing “libertarianism into the Constitution” and stating that “the Court will no longer feel
called upon to announce discovery of a new ‘fundamental right’ before disallowing a policy choice
of which it disapproves as a violation of ‘substantive due process’”); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence
v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1899
(2004) (“Lawrence significantly altered the historical trajectory of substantive due process . . . .”).
But see Basiak, supra note 13, at 896–902 (arguing that the Supreme Court under the leadership
of Chief Justice Roberts will abandon what he calls a “split-the-difference” jurisprudence reflected
in the Lawrence and Casey decisions in favor of a consistent rules-based approach to substantive
due process).
169. Another example of the distinction between fundamental rights and “garden variety”
liberty interests that enjoy less protection is found in the right-to-travel cases. The Supreme Court
has held that the right to interstate travel is a fundamental right that triggers strict scrutiny review,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969), but “international travel has been considered to
be no more than an aspect of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment,” Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176–77 (1978). More recently, the Court has
recognized that the validity of durational residency requirements should be analyzed under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502–03
(1999).
Many constitutional scholars have suggested that Lawrence may mark
the demise of Glucksberg’s two-tier analysis.  In any event, lower courts168
that have interpreted Glucksberg to preclude any review of executive
misconduct absent a fundamental right are misguided—such
interpretations deny the existence of the “second tier” of the Glucksberg
analysis and thereby deprive litigants of the opportunity to show that, even
absent a fundamental right, they have been subjected to “substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints” on liberty.  Government169
interference with any form of liberty will not necessarily trigger strict
scrutiny, but this does not mean that government officials, including those
in the executive branch, may violate rights with impunity. The essence of
substantive due process is protection of individuals from the exercise of
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170. See Christensen v. County of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 468–69 (7th Cir. 2007) (Ripple, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority erred in failing to recognize that
the “essence of substantive due process is protection of the individual from the exercise of
governmental power without reasonable justification,” and that government officials who not only
act unreasonably in the execution of their duties, but who also use their positions “not in connection
with any official duty but for [their] own purposes” have abused their power in a manner that
shocks the conscience).
171. See supra Part II.A.
172. See, e.g., Ali v. Ramsdell, 423 F.3d 810, 814 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding allegations that
police officers seized and kept about $5,000 while executing a search warrant did not state a claim
against the officer for violation of substantive or procedural due process because the plaintiff’s state
law conversion claim provided an adequate remedy for the alleged injury); Lee v. City of Chi., 330
F.3d 456, 467 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that where a substantive due process challenge involves only
property, the plaintiff must show either the inadequacy of state law remedies or an independent
constitutional violation before the court will even engage in the deferential rational-basis/arbitrary-
conduct review); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 123 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that where a denial
of handgun application is fully rectified in state court, invoking federal due process would trivialize
the doctrine; due process is violated only when state courts cannot rectify an injury); United of
Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Solomon, 960 F.2d 31, 35 (6th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a substantive due
process claim because the plaintiff’s loss of a government contract did not implicate a fundamental
right and because the injury could easily be remedied in state court).
government power without reasonable justification.  Although negligent170
misconduct will never meet the shocks-the-conscience standard, where
actions intentionally injure without any justifiable interest or where
government officials act with deliberate indifference to the serious harm
their actions might cause, the guarantee of substantive due process has
been violated and a remedy should be available.
Another concern with limiting challenges of executive misconduct to
the deprivation of fundamental rights is that most claims involving
property will be automatically rejected because property rights, and
economic interests in general, have not been treated as fundamental rights,
at least since the demise of Lochner.  Thus, courts will dismiss claims171
involving particularly egregious denials of employment, licenses, or
educational benefits, or egregious actions regarding real property,
regardless of how conscience-shocking the actions may be. The next
section explores this concern.
C.  Rejecting Substantive Due Process Claims Where Only Property
              Rights Are Implicated          
In addition to rejecting substantive due process claims in the absence
of a fundamental right, other courts have reasoned that where only
property rights are at stake no substantive due process claims can exist, or
that such claims must be dismissed whenever state law provides a remedy
for the deprivation.  This rejection of claims involving “merely” property172
may stem, in part, from Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Regents of
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173. 474 U.S. 214 (1985); see Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1354 (6th Cir. 1990)
(asserting that Justice Powell’s concurrence in Ewing led to a split in the circuits over whether
substantive due process “protects run-of-the-mill state-created contractual property interests” but
acknowledging that the majority view would reject such claims).
174. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 222–23.
175. Id. at 225.
176. Id. at 229 (Powell, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 229–30; cf. Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 199 (1979) (holding
that non-renewal of a tenured teacher’s contract may be reviewed under a substantive due process
analysis).
178. See supra Part II.A.
179. In Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Court reasoned that property
interests are not created by the Constitution but are “defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Id. at 577. Applying this
approach, the Supreme Court has held that continued employment may be a property right, Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972), as well as welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 262 n.8 (1970), continued receipt of an education, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975),
and continued electrical and water service, Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S.
1, 11 (1978). This Article contends that all of these forms of property should be protected
substantively and not just procedurally, and thus their arbitrary deprivation is actionable.
the University of Michigan v. Ewing.  The majority opinion assumed,173
without deciding, that the plaintiff possessed a constitutionally protected
property interest in his continued enrollment in a medical-school program
and that the substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects this
property interest.  The Court proceeded to find that the decision to174
dismiss Ewing from the program was made “conscientiously and with
careful deliberation, based on an evaluation of the entirety of Ewing’s
academic career,” and thus the dismissal did not constitute “such a
substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that
the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional
judgment.”  175
In a concurrence, Justice Powell maintained that “substantive due
process rights are created only by the Constitution.”  He reasoned that176
Ewing’s interest in continued enrollment in the school was essentially a
state law contract right that bore “little resemblance to the fundamental
interests that previously have been viewed as implicitly protected by the
Constitution.”  Justice Powell’s opinion appears to confuse the doctrine177
that substantive due process provides “heightened” protection to so-called
fundamental rights with the more basic concept that substantive due
process protects against all arbitrary or capricious deprivations of life,
liberty, and property. As noted, the consequences of finding a fundamental
right are serious because the government must then demonstrate a
compelling interest for its regulation, which must not restrict anymore than
necessary.  However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that178
property rights may have their source in state law when assessing whether
a procedural due process violation has occurred.  Further, in Logan v179
2008] REINING IN ABUSES O F EXEC UTIVE POWER THRO UGH SUBSTANTIVE DUE PRO CESS 553
180. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
181. Id. at 430 (quoting Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
182. See supra Part II.A.
183. See supra note 172.
184. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
185. Id. at 529–30.
186. Id. at 543.
187. Id. at 543–44.
188. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
189. Id. at 125–26 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
Zimmerman Brush Co.,  the Court asserted that “the types of interests180
protected as ‘property’ are varied and, as often as not, intangible, relating
‘to the whole domain of social and economic fact.’”  There is no reason181
to interpret the term “property” more narrowly when a plaintiff raises a
substantive due process claim. Thus, any restriction of substantive due
process to some category of federally protected, fundamental property
rights is inappropriate and misguided.182
Several appellate courts have ruled that even if deprivations of property
are theoretically actionable under substantive due process, courts should
dismiss such claims unless the litigant can prove that the state failed to
afford an available remedy.  The notion that the existence of a state183
remedy should defeat a federal claim has been adopted by the Court only
in the context of certain procedural due process violations. In Parratt v.
Taylor,  prison authorities failed to deliver a package of hobby materials184
that an inmate had ordered through the mail.  The Supreme Court held185
that the random, unauthorized deprivation of the prison inmate’s property
could not give rise to a procedural due process claim where the state
provided an adequate post-deprivation remedy.  The Court reasoned that186
in cases involving random, unauthorized official misconduct, the state
provides all the process that is feasible if it affords the individual a post-
deprivation remedy.  Procedural due process often presents a timing187
question, whether pre- or post-deprivation process is necessary—and the
impossibility of providing pre-deprivation process then defeats the federal
claim. Substantive due process, however, does not focus on the state’s
failure to provide sufficient process. Rather, it is the raw abuse of power
that violates the Constitution, and such abuse is complete at the time of the
act and is unaffected by the existence of state remedies.
In Zinermon v. Burch,  the Supreme Court distinguished the three188
categories of due process—namely, claims arising out of the incorporation
of specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights, claims alleging a
violation of the “substantive component that bars certain arbitrary,
wrongful government actions ‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures
used to implement them,’” and claims asserting procedural due process
violations.  As to the first two types of claims, the Court explained that189
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190. Id.
191. See supra note 172.
192. 342 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1183 (2004), abrogated on other
grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2004).
193. Id. at 689–91. 
194. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (Contract Clause); id. amend. V (Takings Clause); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, § 8.3.1, at 629–30 (Contract Clause); id. § 8.4.1, at 640–41 (Takings
Clause).
195. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188–89 (1928); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); see also Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552
(1972) (“[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. . . . The
right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to
travel, is in truth, a ‘personal’ right . . . .”); Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to
Lochner, 17 SW. U. L. REV. 627, 637–38 (1988) (acknowledging that the Bill of Rights was cut
from a single constitutional cloth and that at common law, “[o]wnership of property was evidence
of liberty”).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 22–26 (discussing Lochner).
197. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590 (1897) (“‘[T]he privilege of . . . acquiring,
holding, and selling property, is an essential part of [the defendant’s] rights of liberty and property,
as guarantied by the fourteenth amendment.’” (quoting Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684
(1888))).
198. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
199. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970); see also cases cited
the constitutional violation was complete when the wrongful act occurred,
and thus state tort remedies were irrelevant.  Only with regard to190
procedural due process claims does a state tort remedy become relevant.
Nonetheless, some lower courts have reasoned that the availability of state
remedies defeats the federal substantive due process claim, at least where
only a property interest is at stake.  For example, the Seventh Circuit, in191
Galdikas v. Fagan,  held that even if university officials acted arbitrarily192
and irrationally in misleading students about the accreditation status of a
social work program, because state law provided an adequate remedy for
violation of this state-created contract right, no substantive due process
violation occurred.193
Rejecting claims involving “only property” ignores the history and
development of substantive due process. The Founders were deeply
concerned with deprivations of property as reflected in the Takings and
Contract Clauses of the Constitution.  Early on, the Supreme Court194
invoked substantive due process to challenge improper zoning decisions,195
as well as laws that arbitrarily interfered with the right to contract and to
earn a livelihood.  Indeed, the Court broadly defined “liberty” to196
encompass what some characterize today as “mere” property rights.197
Further, by the 1960s, spearheaded by an important article by Professor
Charles Reich,  federal courts began to recognize that government198
benefits such as education, welfare, social security, licenses, and jobs are
relied upon by people and should be treated the same as traditional
property rights.  As Professor Reich noted in a subsequent article:199
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supra note 179.
200. Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74
YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965).
201. See supra Part II.B.
202. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (stating that procedural due process
“promotes fairness,” whereas substantive due process “serves to prevent governmental power from
being ‘used for purposes of oppression’” (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856))).
Society today is built around entitlement. . . . Many of the
most important of these entitlements now flow from
government . . . . Such sources of security, whether private or
public, are no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the
recipients they are essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense
a form of charity.200
The recent Supreme Court decisions invoking substantive due process
to protect the property rights of corporate America from excessive punitive
damage awards refute the notion that “mere property” rights are not
protected from “conscience-shocking” misconduct.  Contrary to the201
finding of some lower courts, the Constitution does not read that
government cannot deprive you of a “fundamental right” or a liberty
interest without due process of law; rather, the Constitution states that
government cannot deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.
Further, courts that have dismissed claims based on the existence of an
adequate state remedy have confused substantive with procedural due
process. Procedural due process focuses on whether the state has provided
sufficient protection for an interest through the state’s own procedures,
whereas substantive due process focuses on abuse of power.  Litigants202
should not be permitted to avoid the limitations of Parratt by
characterizing an essentially procedural due process violation as a
substantive due process claim. But when it is clear that plaintiffs are
challenging the egregiousness of the government misconduct or the
arbitrariness of a government decision—and not to the procedures that
have been used—the substantive due process claim should be recognized
and permitted to proceed.
IV.  PRESERVING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AS A MEANINGFUL
GUARANTEE AGAINST MISUSE OF EXECUTIVE POWER
In large part, the concerns that have motivated the Supreme Court to
constrict the use of substantive due process and that, in turn, have
influenced the lower courts, are twofold. First, several Justices have
expressed concerns about judicial activism in an area where there are few
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203. See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“[G]uideposts for
responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.”); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507–13 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (challenging substantive due
process as a mechanism whereby Supreme Court Justices may interject their own predilections and
determine what they believe to be fair); United States v. Logan, 453 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 2006)
(“Laws are not ‘harsh’ or ‘pointless’ in any value-free framework; they seem harsh or pointless by
reference to a given judge’s beliefs about how things ought to work, which is why a claim of power
to revise ‘harsh’ or ‘pointless’ laws elevates the judicial over the legislative branch and must be
resisted.”); Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1404–06 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring) (asserting that substantive due process has no support in the language or history of the
Constitution and instead is a “shorthand for a judicial privilege to condemn things the judges do
not like or cannot understand”), overruled on other grounds by Lester v. Chicago, 830 F.2d 706
(7th Cir. 1987); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 75, 89, 92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
(arguing that substantive due process in essence permits the judiciary to amend the Constitution
without using the deliberate amendment process); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 385–86 (2005) (questioning whether the “discovery” of
unenumerated rights unjustifiably expands judicial power); supra note 2.
204. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282 (1980) (observing that each state has
a paramount interest “in fashioning its own rules of tort law”); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701
(1976) (cautioning that the Court should resist making the Due Process Clause “a font of tort law
to be superimposed” on state systems); see also William Burnham, Separating Constitutional and
Common-Law Torts: A Critique and a Proposed Constitutional Theory of Duty, 73 MINN. L. REV.
515, 544 (1989) (alleging that many due process claims are merely state tort actions
“masquerading” as civil rights suits).
205. See, e.g., Christensen v. County of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 464–65 (7th Cir. 2007)
(reasoning that Lewis calls for judicial restraint in implementing a program of constitutional torts
and mandates that official misconduct, which may be harmful and unjustified by any legitimate
interest, must be left to ordinary tort litigation unless it can be characterized as truly conscience-
shocking).
206. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976)). 
207. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–18 (1962) (describing judicial review as a “deviant institution” in
American democracy and coining the phrase “counter-majoritarian difficulty” to describe the
objective guideposts. Opponents complain that allowing substantive due
process challenges means that more areas of the law will be “federalized”
and that judges, based only on their own subjective preferences, will
second-guess executive or administrative decisions.  Second, the Court203
has opined that fashioning federal remedies where state remedies already
exist violates core principles of federalism. The Court has frequently
expressed a reluctance to displace state courts and state tort law with
federal courts and federal law,  and the lower federal courts have204
followed its lead.205
As to the concern for judicial activism, Justice Scalia has opined that
“‘[i]n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to
respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people.’”206
When the judiciary strikes down democratically enacted laws it thwarts the
will of the people.  In contrast, when plaintiffs use substantive due207
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tension he perceived). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor’s Clothes: Recognizing the
Reality of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1075 (2006) (“[T]he United
States is not a pure democracy; it is a constitutional democracy where the acts of all government
officers are subordinate to the Constitution.”).
208. See Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phila., 5 F.3d 685, 692 (3d Cir. 1993) (asserting that
the determination whether a government official’s actions in a particular case were motivated by
bias, bad faith, or improper motive is a question of fact for the jury to decide in a substantive due
process case), overruled on other grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of
Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003).
209. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
210. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, § 5.1, at 390.
211. See Conkle, supra note 2, at 94 (arguing that substantive due process “serves a
nationalizing function” because “[w]hen the Court recognizes substantive due process rights, they
are national rights that every state and locality must honor”); Chesney, supra note 132, at 1013
(“[I]t makes little sense to define the scope of the constitutional right with reference to the
availability of tort remedies . . . merely on the ground that the federal civil damages remedy through
which the right might be asserted appears to overlap with tort concepts.”); see also Christina Brooks
Whitman, Emphasizing the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 661, 681
(1997) (contending that attempts to prevent overlap with state tort law have resulted in decisions
that limit the substantive scope of constitutional rights).
212. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 327; see also The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Leading
Cases, supra note 142, at 199 (“[S]ubstantive due process analysis is on its firmest footing when
applied to systematic governmental action.”). 
process to remedy raw abuses of government power by its officials, no
harm befalls democratically enacted laws. When a member of the
executive branch violates a constitutional duty and deprives an individual
of life, liberty, or property, a judicial remedy does not undermine
democracy. Jurors decide whether government conduct was motivated by
bad faith or bias and thus merits judicial relief.  Further, when federal208
judges determine that government officials have engaged in arbitrary,
conscience-shocking behavior, no plausible counter-majoritarian difficulty
exists.
As to federalism concerns, the existence of tort remedies should not
determine the fate of federal constitutional violations. In Monroe v.
Pape,  the Supreme Court held that the federal remedy for vindicating209
constitutional deprivations supplements state remedies. Further, federal
rights displace (preempt) state remedies in many situations.  Because210
courts already severely restrict substantive due process violations,
allowing federal claims to proceed for truly egregious violations by
executive branch officials should not be relegated to the vagaries of state
tort law.  A related argument developed by Professor Fallon emphasizes211
that substantive due process should be used only to correct government
action involving laws that have a broad impact on society, rather than to
correct individual injustices that can be vindicated through individual tort
actions.  This distinction ignores the concern that the actions of law212
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213. In his concurrence in Lewis, Justice Scalia demonstrated his disdain for the majority’s
analysis by stating that “today’s opinion resuscitates the ne plus ultra, the Napoleon Brandy, the
Mahatma Gandhi, the Cellophane of subjectivity, th’ ol’ ‘shocks-the-conscience’ test.” County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 861 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). But see
id. at 847 (majority opinion) (“While the measure of what is conscience shocking is no calibrated
yard stick, it does, as Judge Friendly put it, ‘poin[t] the way.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973))).
214. See supra Part II.C.
215. Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1541 (11th Cir. 1991).
216. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000). The statute provides that “the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” Id. § 1988(b). Where the
defendant prevails, fees may be awarded where the suit is “vexatious, frivolous, or brought to
harass or embarrass the defendant.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 n.2 (1983).
218. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an attorney who signs “a
pleading, written motion, or other paper” thereby certifies that “the factual contentions have
evidentiary support” and that the claims are “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
219. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986) (holding that to avoid summary
enforcement officials, government employers, government educators, and
other members of the executive branch may have a significant and broad
corrosive impact, thereby raising the same systemic concerns triggered by
legislative action.
Arguably, the largely undefined labels “arbitrary” and “capricious” or
“conscience-shocking” can be attached to all sorts of government
misconduct, potentially creating an undue strain on federal judicial
resources, as well as on state–federal relations.  However, as previously213
discussed, the Supreme Court has already imposed significant limitations
on substantive due process through cases such as DeShaney, Lewis, and
Graham.  These decisions require that plaintiffs establish a breach of an214
affirmative duty and not merely a failure to act, and that claims be limited
to truly egregious misconduct that cannot be challenged under any more
specific constitutional provision. Courts must determine whether the
deprivation resulted from an abuse of government power sufficient to raise
an ordinary tort to the stature of a constitutional violation.  And while the215
shocks-the-conscience standard appears subjective, the Court in Lewis
made clear that the standard is objective in nature, “asking whether or not
the objective character of certain conduct is consistent with our traditions,
precedents, and historical understanding of the Constitution and its
meaning.”  216
Further, the Supreme Court has protected against vexatious, frivolous
litigation by awarding fees to prevailing defendants pursuant to the Civil
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976,  as well as by imposing217
sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.218
Together with a much more effective use of summary judgment
procedures, weak cases are disposed of at the earliest stages in litigation.219
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judgment an opposing party must show a genuine issue of material fact that impinges upon a
decisive question of law); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251–52 (1986)
(holding that to survive summary judgment, the non-movant must present a “genuine factual
dispute”—i.e., one that “presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury”); see
also Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1222 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[I]t is extremely rare
for a federal court properly to vitiate the action of a state administrative agency as a violation of
substantive due process. The vast majority of such attacks may readily be disposed of on summary
judgment . . . thus keeping interference by federal courts with local government to a salutary
minimum.”).
220. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 244–45 (1974) (holding that absolute immunity extends
to judges, legislators, and prosecutors performing their duties, whereas qualified immunity shields
most executive officials from damage liability unless they violate clearly established law).
Legislative immunity in the context of land use regulation is discussed infra Part IV.D.
221. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (“[I]t is when execution of a
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity
is responsible under § 1983.”).
222. The areas discussed do not purport to be exhaustive. This Article argues that substantive
due process protects individuals from the exercise of government power without reasonable
justification. Thus, whenever government officials use their power not in connection with any
official duty but for their own illicit purposes, a substantive due process violation has occurred. See,
e.g., Christensen v. County of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 467, 469 (7th Cir. 2007) (Ripple, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (maintaining that a deputy who embarked on a personal vendetta
against the plaintiffs—including following the plaintiffs while they were driving lawfully, parking
his squad car near one plaintiff’s place of employment and conducting surveyance of her lawful
activities, and generally carrying out a “pervasive plan of intimidation” with the intent to harm the
plaintiffs—demonstrated “a perverse use of police authority” that “shocks the judicial conscience,”
and thus asserting that the majority erred in not recognizing a cause of action for this raw abuse of
power). The areas discussed, however, appear to generate most of the litigation in this area.
In addition, the doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity, which
safeguard individual officials, mitigate damage liability concerns.  Also,220
the Court’s rejection of the doctrine of respondeat superior in § 1983
litigation insulates government entities from monetary liability unless a
policymaker’s conduct is challenged or a custom or policy is
established.  221
In light of these significant safeguards and limitations on liability,
federal courts should not be reluctant to recognize substantive due process
claims provided the plaintiff identifies a property or liberty interest within
the broad, historic meaning of those terms and demonstrates that the
misconduct shocks the judicial conscience. Conscience-shocking conduct
must reflect deliberate indifference to victims’ rights where there is time
to deliberate or an intent to harm where deliberation is not feasible.
Applying this analysis, substantive due process would continue to play a
vital role in remedying abuses of government power in several areas of the
law, including those described in this Part.222
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223. See, e.g., Young v. Twp. of Green Oak, 471 F.3d 674, 684–86 (6th Cir. 2006) (“‘Absent
the infringement of some fundamental right,’ however, this court has held that ‘the termination of
public employment does not constitute a denial of federal substantive due process.’” (quoting
Sutton v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 958 F.2d 1339, 1351 (6th Cir. 1992))); Silva v. Bieluch, 351 F.3d
1045, 1047 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that deputy sheriffs who alleged arbitrary transfer could not
state a due process claim because employment rights are state-created and not “fundamental” rights
protected by the Constitution, and thus no substantive due process protection exists); Nicholas v.
Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 142–43 (3d Cir. 2000) (observing that the great majority of courts
of appeals have concluded that a public employee’s interest in continued employment is not so
“fundamental” as to be protected by substantive due process); Indep. Enters. v. Pittsburgh Water
& Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d 1165, 1180 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that a contractor whose bids were
allegedly arbitrarily rejected by a city did not assert “the sort of ‘fundamental’ interest entitled to
the protection of substantive due process”); Zorzi v. County of Putnam, 30 F.3d 885, 895 (7th Cir.
1994) (holding that occupational liberty is protected only by procedural due process not by
substantive due process); Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1353–55 (6th Cir. 1990) (arguing that
most state-created contract rights, while protected by procedural due process, enjoy no protection
under substantive due process).
224. Galdikas v. Fagan, 342 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that even if officials acted
arbitrarily and irrationally, because state law provides an adequate remedy for violation of a state-
created contract right, no substantive due process violation may be found: “‘Supreme Court
precedent requir[es] plaintiffs complaining of arbitrary deprivation of their property to seek redress
through state remedies’” (quoting Contreras v. City of Chi., 119 F.3d 1286, 1295 (7th Cir. 1997))),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1183 (2004), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928
(7th Cir. 2004); Khan v. Gallitano, 180 F.3d 829, 834–35 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting an attorney’s
substantive due process claim that village officials interfered with her contract with a client because
she could not demonstrate why her state-law remedies were constitutionally inadequate); Swartz
v. Scruton, 964 F.2d 607, 611 n.6 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that employment contract claims that
merely allege deprivation of protected property interests are not actionable unless some other
substantive right is asserted or state remedies are inadequate); see also Charles, 910 F.2d at 1355
(“[T]he availability of an adequate state remedy . . . suggest[s that the court] should not recognize
[an employee’s] contractual promotion right as fundamental and hence protected by substantive due
process.”).
225. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
226. Id. at 492.
A.  Government Employment
Several courts have ruled that arbitrary employment decisions, no
matter how egregious, do not give rise to substantive due process claims
because employment is not a fundamental right.  Other courts, like the223
Seventh Circuit, have held that a plaintiff may bring substantive due
process claims based on mere property rights only if the plaintiff can
demonstrate the unavailability of any state remedies.  These decisions224
clearly contradict Supreme Court precedent dating back to the 1950s.
In Greene v. McElroy,  the Court acknowledged that an employee225
who loses her job may sometimes allege either deprivation of a property
right in her particular job or a liberty interest in practicing her chosen
profession.  A property interest is recognized when the government226
creates a legal claim of entitlement through its contracts, its statutes, or its
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227. See supra note 179 (discussing Roth). 
228. 440 U.S. 194 (1979).
229. Id. at 197–99. Although the Supreme Court found no substantive due process violation
because it determined that the action was not irrational on the merits, the appellate courts inferred
from the analysis in Harrah that “the Court necessarily recognized a substantive due process right
to be free from arbitrary and capricious state action in this particular context.” Moore v. Warwick
Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 29, 794 F.2d 322, 329 (8th Cir. 1986); cf. Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419,
425–26 (8th Cir. 1989) (reasoning that Harrah established that continued employment is not so
“fundamental” as to be protected under substantive due process).
230. See supra Part II.A.
231. 526 U.S. 286 (1999).
232. Id. at 291–92.
233. See, e.g., Morris v. Clifford, 903 F.2d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a tenured
college professor “has a substantive due process right to be free from discharge for reasons that are
‘arbitrary and capricious,’ or in other words, for reasons that are . . . unrelated to the education
process, or wholly unsupported by a basis in fact”); Newman v. Massachusetts, 884 F.2d 19, 25 (1st
Cir. 1989) (holding that a tenured school teacher who was subjected to an arbitrary and capricious
decision significantly affecting his employment status stated a viable substantive due process
claim); Gargiul v. Tompkins, 704 F.2d 661, 668 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that substantive due
process requires any action impairing a teacher’s property interest in continued employment to have
“a rational relation to a proper governmental purpose”), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other
grounds, 465 U.S. 1016 (1984); Brenna v. S. Colo. State Coll., 589 F.2d 475, 476 (10th Cir. 1978)
(holding that a tenured professor had a property interest “deserving of the procedural and
substantive protections of the Fourteenth Amendment”); cf. Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d
133, 140–43 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a professor’s property interest in his tenured professorship
was not entitled to substantive due process protection because he had not been deprived of a
fundamental property right).
234. See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 996 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that an
employee “stated a valid claim . . . under substantive due process by alleging that Defendants’
actions prevented her from pursuing her profession”), cert. granted on other grounds, 128 S. Ct.
977 (2008); Silverstein v. Gwinnett Hosp. Auth., 861 F.2d 1560, 1566 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding
that staff privileges at a public hospital constitute a protected liberty interest because they implicate
the right to engage in a common occupation of life).
conduct.  Thus, in Harrah Independent School District v. Martin,  the227 228
Court reviewed the non-renewal of a tenured teacher’s contract under a
substantive due process analysis.  In addition, the Liberty Clause of the229
Fourteenth Amendment has, since the early twentieth century, been
interpreted to include the right to engage in a lawful calling.  Moreover,230
in 1999, in Conn v. Gabbert,  the Court recognized a “generalized due231
process right to choose one’s field of private employment.”  232
Following these Supreme Court cases, a few appellate courts have
permitted substantive due process challenges brought, for example, by
tenured teachers or professors who are terminated for arbitrary reasons and
thus are deprived of an identified property interest.  Other appellate233
courts have recognized a substantive due process violation where an
individual, due to arbitrary, irrational government action, is totally
deprived of a liberty interest in pursuing an occupation.  Indeed, the234
Eighth Circuit, which has restricted substantive due process claims to the
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235. Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 478 F.3d 869, 874 (8th Cir. 2007). The court explained,
however, that this fundamental right does not encompass a brief interruption of work in a desired
occupation but only the “‘complete prohibition of the right to engage in a calling.’” Id. (quoting
Conn, 526 U.S. at 291–92); cf. Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419, 428 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that
occupational liberty is never protected by substantive due process, but only under procedural due
process, because “[a]n at-will public employee’s ‘occupational liberty’ should not be utilized as a
vehicle for a federal court to interfere with employment decisions under the rubric of substantive
due process”).
236. Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 443 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Santiago de
Castro v. Morales Medina, 943 F.2d 129, 131–32 (1st Cir. 1991) (recognizing these two alternative
ways of proving a substantive due process violation but concluding that the plaintiff’s “right to
pursue her employment free from emotional health risks resulting from her supervisor’s verbal
harassment” did not warrant substantive due process protection because such protection “would
embroil federal courts in everyday workplace disputes between employers and their employees”).
237. See Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 749 (4th Cir. 1999) (“There is no general liberty
interest in being free of even the most arbitrary and capricious government action; the substantive
component of the due process clause only protects from arbitrary government action that infringes
a specific liberty interest.”); Nunez v. City of L.A., 147 F.3d 867, 873 (9th Cir. 1998) (“There is
no general liberty interest in being free from capricious government action.”); Valot v. Se. Local
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 107 F.3d 1220, 1233 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[M]erely to state that the Due
Process Clause was ‘intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government’ . . . does nothing to state a claim under the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause.” (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994))); Movers Warehouse, Inc. v. City
of Little Can., 71 F.3d 716, 718 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The possession of a protected life, liberty, or
property interest is . . . a condition precedent to [any due process claim.]”); Dover Elevator Co. v.
Ark. State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 445–46 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Analysis of either a procedural or
substantive due process claim must begin with an examination of the interest allegedly violated.”);
Zorzi v. County of Putnam, 30 F.3d 885, 895 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Thus, in the absence of a life, liberty
or property interest [the officer] could be terminated for arbitrary and capricious reasons.”). The
courts that mandate plaintiffs, as a threshold matter, to assert a liberty or property interest often cite
the Supreme Court’s decision in Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985):
“‘the Court has no license to invalidate legislation which it thinks merely arbitrary or
unreasonable.’” Id. at 226 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977)
(White, J., dissenting)).
238. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
deprivation of fundamental rights, has acknowledged a “fundamental right
to engage in one’s chosen occupation.”  The First Circuit has taken the235
most liberal approach, interpreting Supreme Court precedent to permit any
employee to bring a substantive due process claim either by identifying a
specific property or liberty interest or by showing that the state’s conduct
“shocks the conscience.”  236
The vast majority of courts, however, reject the First Circuit’s position
and require employees to identify a protected property or liberty interest
in their jobs.  Moreover, as noted, many recent cases have explicitly237
rejected employment claims as not founded on any fundamental right.238
Proving a state-created property interest or complete denial of the right to
pursue one’s calling, and that the deprivation was so arbitrary that it
“shocks the conscience,” will be very difficult. However, decisions from
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239. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Holloway, 316 F.3d 777, 786–87 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that a
sheriff who pointed his loaded gun at his employees at close range, while making direct and
forceful threats to kill them or inflict grievous bodily injury, was deliberately using his power as
a means of oppressing those employed in his department, thereby elevating his conduct to the
arbitrary and conscience-shocking level prohibited by substantive due process); see also cases cited
supra notes 233–34.
240. Cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006) (noting that “public employees do not
surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment” but holding that where
government employees speak in the context of their job duties, their speech is not protected by the
First Amendment). 
241. 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
242. Id. at 126.
243. Id. at 126–27; see supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (discussing DeShaney).
244. Collins, 503 U.S. at 117, 127–28.
245. See Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 74, 85 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that federal
officials who allegedly misled emergency workers to forgo the use of respirators following the 9/11
attacks in New York City could not be held liable, because a failure to warn employees of a known
danger is not actionable under substantive due process and because their action did not “shock the
contemporary conscience”); Estate of Phillips v. Dist. of Columbia, 455 F.3d 397, 403–07 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (holding that because the Due Process Clause does not require a public employer to
protect employees from inherent job-related risks, a firefighter who died and those who were
injured in a fire due to a failure to provide adequate training could not assert a substantive due
process claim); Upsher v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 285 F.3d 448, 453 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding
that, in the employment context, evidence that the defendant employer was deliberately indifferent
the more liberal circuits demonstrate that government officials do make
capricious employment decisions, and when this occurs, the officials
should be held accountable.  Government employees and licensees do239
not give up their right to be free from hostile, arbitrary, or malicious
treatment by the government.240
These cases all involve negative employment decisions, such as
demotions, suspensions, and terminations. Other substantive due process
issues arise from decisions that adversely affect the work environment,
such as those that create a hazardous workplace. These cases are
particularly difficult because the Supreme Court has specifically refused
to find that the substantive component of the Due Process Clause requires
a safe work environment. In Collins v. City of Harker Heights,  the Court241
found that neither the text nor history of the Due Process Clause supports
a governmental duty to provide a safe working environment.  Relying on242
its earlier DeShaney decision, the Court emphasized that the Constitution
is a charter of negative liberties and that the Constitution does not impose
affirmative obligations on the government unless it has deprived the victim
of the ability to protect herself.  Thus, sending the plaintiff down a243
manhole without proper equipment to protect him from deadly gases could
not be regarded as a deprivation of life and liberty.  Several lower courts244
have relied on the Collins analysis to reject claims that government
officials acted with deliberate indifference in failing to address a
dangerous work environment.245
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to an unreasonable risk of harm does not give rise to a violation of substantive due process);
Martinez v. Uphoff, 265 F.3d 1130, 1133 n.3 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a prison guard who was
murdered by prison inmates did not have a “special relationship” with his employer because the
relationship was consensual in nature); Tucker v. City of Hot Springs, 204 F.3d 783, 783–84 (8th
Cir. 2000) (requiring an employee to enter and inspect buildings that were dangerous, unsanitary,
and unhealthy, although special safety equipment had not yet arrived, does not violate substantive
due process, because the employee was not in a custodial setting, nor was he ordered to enter the
building under threat of losing his job); White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d 1253, 1257–58 (11th Cir.
1999) (holding that even the risk that an employee would lose her job if she did not submit to
unsafe job conditions does not convert a voluntary employment relationship into a custodial
relationship, nor does it entitle an employee to substantive due process protection from workplace
hazards; thus, the plaintiff’s claim that she was beaten by a county jail inmate while working in the
jail infirmary was not actionable); Wallace v. Adkins, 115 F.3d 427, 429–30 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a prison guard who was stabbed by an inmate who had previously threatened this
guard failed to state a substantive due process claim because he had no custodial relationship with
his employer). 
246. See supra Part III.A.
247. Lombardi, 485 F.3d at 79–82 (holding that although EPA officials had no affirmative
duty to protect 9/11 workers who performed search-and-rescue tasks from exposure to
environmental contaminants, allegations that defendants assured site workers that the air in Lower
Manhattan was safe to breathe—thereby creating a false sense of security that induced them to
forgo protective gear might be actionable under danger-creation theory); Sperle v. Mich. Dep’t of
Corrs., 297 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that although the plaintiff could not allege a
custodial relationship because she voluntarily sought her job as a storekeeper at state prison, the
court should determine whether the defendants created a risk of harm to the plaintiff or rendered
her more vulnerable to danger); Eddy v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 256 F.3d 204, 212–13 (3d Cir.
2001) (holding that the substantive due process right to be free from treatment that shocks the
conscience applies to a governmental employer’s treatment of its employees; thus, the employee
should be given the opportunity to prove that he was forced to work in unsafe conditions, which
caused his injury); L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that substantive due
process rights are implicated where responsible officials act with deliberate indifference to the
safety of employees in the presence of a state-created danger).
248. 480 F.3d 511, 511–12 (7th Cir. 2007).
However, the DeShaney/Collins line of cases recognizes that the Due
Process Clause demands protection if the state disables its employees from
protecting themselves or if the state creates or exacerbates a danger to
them.  Thus, government employers should be held accountable if they246
created a dangerous situation and acted with deliberate indifference, not
mere negligence, to the safety of employees. A few courts have recognized
this distinction.  Most courts, however, have failed to differentiate247
between mere inaction and affirmative government decisions that render
a work environment more dangerous. For example, in Witkowski v.
Milwaukee County,  the Seventh Circuit held that a decision to allow a248
dangerous inmate into the courtroom without a stun belt cannot provide
the basis for alleging danger creation when the inmate grabs a gun and
shoots the guard. The court reasoned that the injured guard had chosen “to
enter a snake pit or a lion’s den for compensation,” and thus he could not
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249. Id. at 513.
250. Id.
251. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349–50 (1976).
252. 441 U.S. 520, 535–37 & n.16 (1979).
253. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
254. Id. at 395 n.10; see also Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 900–03 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding
that when a plaintiff’s excessive-force claim—whether the plaintiff is a prisoner, arrestee, detainee,
or an innocent bystander—falls outside the specific protection of the Bill of Rights, that plaintiff
may seek redress under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
255. But see Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 591–93 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that
there is no requirement that jail officials ensure the safety of their inmates, even though the case
involved claims brought by pretrial detainees who were severely beaten by other inmates).
256. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 523.
complain: “higher wages compensate people whose jobs are risky.”  The249
court declined to transform a claim of mere inaction into an “active”
abuse-of-power case that triggers liability for bad decision-making.250
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has warned that “[t]he federal court is not
the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of personnel
decisions that are made daily by public agencies.”  But where251
government officials through their affirmative acts and decisions create a
dangerous situation reflecting such deliberate indifference to the welfare
of employees that it shocks the conscience, courts should not hesitate to
impose liability.
B.  Treatment of Arrestees and Detainees
Arrestees and pretrial detainees whose claims do not fall under the
Fourth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment may pursue relief under
substantive due process. In Bell v. Wolfish,  the Supreme Court held that252
the Due Process Clause, rather than the Eighth Amendment, governs
challenges to the conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees. Further,
in Graham v. Connor,  the Court acknowledged “that the Due Process253
Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that
amounts to punishment.”  Unlike the situation of government employees254
or licensees, courts can readily identify a liberty interest in bodily integrity
and a duty to protect because of the custodial relationship between
arrestees and their captor.  Rather, the difficult question has been255
ascertaining the appropriate standard of review.
In Wolfish—the seminal case on substantive due process claims of
pretrial detainees—the Supreme Court focused on whether the particular
misconduct was punitive because pretrial detainees who have not been
convicted of a crime cannot be punished in any manner.  The Court then256
admonished that “if a restriction or condition [of pretrial detention] is not
reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a
court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action
is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua
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257. Id. at 539.
258. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 169 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 537–38
(listing factors for determining whether a condition of confinement is punitive, such as “‘[w]hether
the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded
as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment . . . , whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned.’” (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69
(1963))).
259. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 169 (reasoning that a deliberate-indifference standard applies).
260. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849–50 (1998).
261. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (noting that this is an open question).
262. O’Connor v. Huard, 117 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997).
263. See Hart v. Sheahan, 396 F.3d 887, 892–94 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that if brutal
treatment of pretrial detainees is gratuitous, even if the motive is not punishment, “due process in
its substantive sense has been violated”; thus, inmates confined to their cells for forty-eight to fifty
hours at a time with no observation by guards stated an actionable claim).
264. Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1005–06 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 538 (1979)).
265. McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1564 (11th Cir. 1996).
detainees.”  Thus, where the government purposefully imposes257
disabilities, the Wolfish “punitive” inquiry is appropriate.  Where a258
punitive motive is not inferable, Lewis appears to provide the standard for
challenges to prison conditions.  Under Lewis, the deprivation of liberty259
must shock the conscience in order to be actionable, but plaintiffs may
meet this standard in a non-emergency situation provided that plaintiffs
show deliberate indifference to their rights.  Arguably, arrestees and260
pretrial detainees are entitled to greater protection than convicted
prisoners, but the Supreme Court has not definitively answered this
question.  261
Guided by Wolfish, some courts have acknowledged that although
prison officials may act to maintain order and security in a detention
facility, officials cannot punish pretrial detainees or arrestees. Thus,
arbitrary or purposeless restrictions or conditions should be found
unconstitutional.  Recognizing this distinction, the Seventh Circuit has262
held that, unlike convicted prisoners bringing Eighth Amendment claims,
detainees do not have to prove an “intent to punish” to establish a
substantive due process violation.  Even where the plaintiff cannot prove263
an intent to punish, a substantive due process violation will be found when
(1) a restriction does not rationally relate to a legitimate, non-punitive
government purpose, (2) a restriction is excessive in light of that purpose,
or (3) prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk to a
detainee’s safety.  Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has reasoned that even264
if intent to punish is required, it “may be inferred when[ever] a condition
of pretrial detention is not reasonably related to a legitimate
government[al] goal.”  Unlike the Eighth Amendment, which precludes265
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266. Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 163–66 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Surprenant v. Rivas,
424 F.3d 5, 13–14 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that a pretrial detainee has the right to be free from any
punishment prior to conviction and thus any discipline imposed during the detention period must
be roughly proportionate to the gravity of the infraction; prison officials’ fabrication of a serious
charge knowing that it would lead to the plaintiff’s immediate placement in segregation without
any intervening hearing was arbitrary punishment that violated substantive due process); Slade v.
Hampton Roads Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 250 (4th Cir. 2005) (conceding that due process rights
of a pretrial detainee are in one sense greater than those afforded under the Eighth Amendment—a
convicted prisoner is entitled only to protection against cruel and unusual punishment, whereas
pretrial detainees must not be subjected to any form of punishment); Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d
35, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2003) (reasoning that because they have not been convicted of a crime, pretrial
detainees “may not be punished in any manner—neither cruelly and unusually nor otherwise”).
267. Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 902 (5th Cir. 1998).
268. Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 922–23 (10th Cir. 2007) (alterations in original) (quoting
Livsey v. Salt Lake County, 275 F.3d 952, 957–58 (10th Cir. 2001)).
269. Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1167 (4th Cir. 1997).
270. Id. (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
only “cruel and unusual” punishment, substantive due process protects
pretrial detainees from any punishment;  thus, the standard should be266
different.
Nonetheless, the trend in the appellate courts is to impose significant
restrictions on arrestees and detainees who bring substantive due process
claims. In the Fifth Circuit, for example, to prove constitutionally
impermissible excessive force, the plaintiff must show (1) that the actions
are “grossly disproportionate to the need for action[,] . . . inspired by
malice rather than merely careless or unwise excess of zeal,” such that
they amounted to “abuse of official power that shocks the conscience,”
and (2) that, as a result, the plaintiff suffered injuries, which need not
necessarily be severe.  Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has reasoned that the267
conduct “‘must do more than show that the government actor intentionally
or recklessly caused injury to the plaintiff by abusing or misusing
government power . . . . [It] must demonstrate a degree of outrageousness
and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience
shocking.’”  In addition, the Fourth Circuit has required both a showing268
of the requisite state of mind—i.e., deliberate indifference—and that the
injury be more than de minimis.  These requirements help ensure that269
federal courts will not be swamped with similar claims demanding the
courts to scrutinize “minutiae of state detention activities” contrary to the
Supreme Court’s admonition that “the Constitution is not a ‘font of tort
law.’”270
Further, several appellate courts have made it more difficult for
arrestees and detainees to win substantive due process claims by treating
arrestees and detainees the same as convicted felons. The Supreme Court
has ruled that in a failure-to-protect case an Eighth Amendment violation
will be found only if prison officials acted with both objective and
subjective deliberate indifference, thus requiring evidence that prison
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271. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 831, 837–38 (1994).
272. Id. at 838–40.
273. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
274. Id. at 319 (quoting Ingraham ex rel. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977)).
275. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (emphasis added); see also
Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 727–29 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Due Process Clause
provides pretrial detainees with protection that equals, if not exceeds, that afforded under the Eighth
Amendment, and then finding that allegations that detainees were subjected to cold cells with
leaking ceilings for several months and that officials confiscated inmates’ blankets when they
complained about the cold—and even tore down garbage bags that cellmates had attached to the
ceiling in an attempt to catch the leaks—raised serious fact issues about whether officials acted with
deliberate indifference to a serious deprivation and thus the district court erred in dismissing the
lawsuit); Hartsfield v. Colburn, 371 F.3d 454, 456–57 (8th Cir. 2004) (ruling that a detainee’s claim
that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his need for dental care should have been
analyzed under the Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment; thus, the district court
erred in granting summary judgment where there were factual questions about whether jail
personnel acted with deliberate indifference when they did not arrange dental treatment until more
than six weeks after the detainee’s written request, causing him to suffer further pain and infection).
276. See Andujar v. Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199, 1203–04 (11th Cir. 2007) (revised opinion)
(reasoning that the standard that governs claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
of pretrial detainees is the same as the standard that covers convicted prisoners under the Eighth
Amendment, and thus a detainee must establish an objectively serious medical need and that
government officials acted with deliberate indifference to that need; therefore, even if paramedics
knew of risk of serious harm and yet disregarded that risk when, contrary to agency protocol, they
failed to treat the detainee’s serious dog-bite wounds until after booking, a two-hour delay did not
prove deliberate indifference); Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340, 344–45 (8th Cir. 2006) (asserting
that, although the Supreme Court in Bell held that unlike the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process
Clause restricts punishing detainees prior to an adjudication of guilt, the same deliberate-
indifference standard applies to “claims that prison officials unconstitutionally ignored a serious
medical need or failed to protect [a] detainee from a serious risk of harm”; thus, even if prison
policies do not reasonably relate to legitimate government objectives, no substantive due process
violation existed unless the county sheriff acted with deliberate indifference to a serious health risk
that tuberculosis posed to detainees in the county jail); Pietrafeso v. Lawrence County, 452 F.3d
978, 982–84 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference standard
applies to pretrial detainees, and absent evidence that a jailer actually knew of and recklessly
disregarded a risk of serious harm to a detainee in denying him access to his prescribed
officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm.  This271
“subjective recklessness” standard allows an official to escape liability
even when he fails “to alleviate a significant risk that he should
have perceived[,] but did not.”  Further, in Whitley v. Albers,  the Court272 273
ruled that inflicting pain while securing a prison does not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment unless the plaintiff proves an “‘unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain’” in light of the circumstances confronted by
the prison official.  274
Initially, many appellate courts rejected these restrictive decisions,
relying on the Supreme Court’s statement that those not convicted of
a crime must receive protection “at least as great as the
Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.”275
However, several recent appellate decisions maintain that the
Eighth Amendment and substantive due process standards are identical.276
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medications, the deliberate-indifference standard cannot be met); Drake ex rel. Cotton v. Koss, 445
F.3d 1038, 1042 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that, to find a prison official liable for deliberate
indifference to a suicide risk, the plaintiff must show that the official actually knew that the
detainee faced a substantial risk of serious harm and yet failed to reasonably respond to abate that
risk); Vaughn v. Greene County, 438 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that, although
some decisions from the Eighth Circuit have stated a lighter burden for pretrial detainees than for
convicted prisoners, and this circuit has yet to establish a clear standard, the circuit has repeatedly
applied the same deliberate-indifference standard used in Eighth Amendment analysis; thus, the
plaintiff must prove that the official actually knew of the risk and yet deliberately disregarded it);
Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1271–73 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that, although claims
involving mistreatment of pretrial detainees are governed by due process rather than the Eighth
Amendment, the applicable standards are the same, but ultimately finding that correction officers’
conduct in subduing an unruly pretrial detainee by holding him face down on his bunk until he
became unconscious and then waiting fourteen minutes before calling for medical assistance was
actionable as both excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs); Snow ex rel. Snow
v. City of Citronelle, 420 F.3d 1262, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that liability for suicide of
a pretrial detainee is analyzed under the Fourteenth, rather than the Eighth, Amendment, and
requires showing that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a strong likelihood that the
deceased would commit suicide while in jail, yet determining that employees who lacked subjective
knowledge of the detainee’s potential for suicide could not be held liable); Fisher v. Lovejoy, 414
F.3d 659, 661–64 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that, although substantive due process protects pretrial
detainees from punishment and requires jail officials to protect detainees from violence, a violation
will be found only where the officials actually knew that inmates faced a substantial risk of serious
harm but disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures); Cook v. Sheriff of Monroe
County, 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the due process standard is the same
as the Eighth Amendment standard regarding claims that pretrial detainees have been denied basic
necessities such as medical care, and thus plaintiffs must show that jail officials deliberately
disregarded a strong likelihood, not a possibility, that self-inflicted harm would occur); Gray v. City
of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a pretrial detainee’s right to adequate
medical treatment is the same as that afforded prisoners under the Eighth Amendment, and thus a
plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his suicidal behavior
and that the defendant actually knew the detainee was at risk of committing suicide); Estate of
Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 758 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that due process claims of pretrial
detainees are evaluated under the same legal standard as an Eighth Amendment claim, and thus a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the sheriff made a deliberate decision to disregard the detainee’s
safety), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1115 (2005); Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th
Cir. 2003) (holding that the Eighth Amendment provides the benchmark for due process claims
brought by a pretrial detainee, and thus a plaintiff must prove that officials knew of and disregarded
an excessive risk to health and safety and that the deprivation was “sufficiently serious”); Burrell
v. Hampshire County, 307 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that, although pretrial detainees are
protected under the Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment, the standard is the
same—namely, a pretrial detainee must demonstrate that he was incarcerated under conditions
imposing a substantial risk of serious harm and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent
in that they were subjectively aware of facts from which an inference of substantial risk could be
drawn and they actually drew such an inference); Gibbs v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545, 548–50 (5th
Cir. 2001) (holding that there is no significant distinction between pretrial detainees and convicted
inmates concerning basic human needs, and in both cases the same deliberate-indifference standard
applies, i.e., a pretrial detainee must show that the state official knew of and disregarded an
excessive risk to the inmate’s health or safety); Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388–89 (4th Cir.
2001) (asserting that regardless of whether plaintiff is a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner the
standard is the same in determining deliberate indifference to serious medical needs: the deprivation
must be objectively sufficiently serious and the official must have culpable state of mind in the
sense of subjective recklessness); Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000) (conceding
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that because a pretrial detainee may not be punished, the Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth
Amendment applies, but holding, nonetheless, that the Eighth Amendment test should be used when
pretrial detainees sue under the Due Process Clause); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490–91
(11th Cir. 1996) (finding that claims involving mistreatment of arrestees or pretrial detainees are
governed by due process rather than the Eighth Amendment but that the applicable standard is the
same—plaintiffs must meet Farmer’s standard of subjective and objective deliberate indifference
to a substantial risk of serious harm).
277. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) (“We explicitly rejected analogies to the
Eighth Amendment that would require a showing of wantonness on the part of the prison official,
or a showing that the alleged conditions were so inhumane as to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.” (citations omitted)).
278. Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 154,163–66 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that in assessing
a pretrial detainee’s challenge to conditions of confinement, which included triple-celling of
detainees in a cell designed to be occupied by a single person, the district court should have
employed a due process analysis, rather than the Eighth Amendment standard, which mandates only
that punishment not be cruel and unusual; whereas Eighth Amendment is designed to protect those
convicted of crimes, pretrial detainees cannot be punished at all under the Due Process Clause);
Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that due process
affords a pretrial detainee a right to adequate medical attention; thus, a detainee who shows serious
medical need and acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that
need have stated a cause of action under substantive due process).
279. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the district court erred
in using the Eighth Amendment, rather than the substantive due process standard in judging a claim
brought by an individual detained while awaiting civil commitment proceedings; “‘due process
requires that the nature and duration of [a] commitment bear [a] reasonable relation to the purpose
for which the individual is committed’” (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972))),
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 820 (2005); Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120–22 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that the deliberate-indifference standard demanded under the Eighth Amendment
should not govern whether a state hospital is liable for due process violations of an incapacitated
criminal defendant who has not yet been convicted of a crime; the state mental hospital violated
substantive due process by delaying admission of incapacitated criminal defendants for evaluation
and treatment); see also Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 697–99 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that
sexual offenders civilly committed to a state psychiatric hospital stated a claim for violation of their
substantive due process right to safe confinement where they alleged that they were intentionally
exposed to feces, urine, and blood in the hospital courtyards, bathrooms, and hallways, and that
they were subjected to verbal harassment, physical abuse, and sexual assaults by other detainees).
280. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986); see also supra note 261 and
accompanying text. 
Only the Second,  Third,  and Ninth  Circuits have consistently held277 278 279
that the standard of deliberate indifference that applies to those not yet
convicted of any crimes need not meet the draconian subjective-state-of-
mind requirements of the Eighth Amendment.
Although the Supreme Court has not further clarified the analysis that
should govern arrestees’ and detainees’ claims where the “intent to
punish” standard from Wolfish is inapplicable or inappropriate,  no280
reason exists to vary from the standard set forth in Lewis—namely,
government officials who act with “objectively” deliberate indifference to
the well-being of arrestees or detainees, in a situation where there is time
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281. See supra Part II.C.
282. See, e.g., Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.3d 803, 819–22 (6th Cir. 2005) (recognizing
that less flagrant conduct than required under Farmer may constitute deliberate indifference in
medical treatment cases brought by pretrial detainees and that a doctor’s provision of medical care
may amount to deliberate indifference if it is “‘so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive
as to shock the conscience’” (quoting Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834,
844 (6th Cir. 2001))); Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 577 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting
Farmer’s definition of deliberate indifference in favor of a test requiring “‘conscious disregard of
known or obvious dangers’ [or] . . . ‘a deliberate choice to avoid an obvious danger . . . if the choice
results in harm to a protected interest, even though the defendant obtusely lacks actual knowledge
of the danger.’” (quoting West ex rel. Norris v. Waymire, 114 F.3d 646, 651 (7th Cir. 1997))).
283. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989).
284. See supra notes 91–97 and accompanying text. 
285. See supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text. But cf. Meeker v. Edmundson, 415 F.3d
317, 321–23 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that a student could maintain a substantive due process claim
against a wrestling coach for intentionally encouraging team members to beat the plaintiff—where
the facts alleged more than a mere failure to protect—and a coach cannot escape liability simply
because he did not personally administer the beatings).
286. Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997)
to deliberate, should be held accountable for their wrongdoing.  A281
standard of “wanton” infliction of pain is unnecessary because detainees
and arrestees cannot constitutionally be punished. Further, a test of “knew
or should have known” of a risk to safety, rather than an “actual
knowledge” test, should be applied because arrestees and detainees are
entitled to greater protection than those who have been convicted of a
crime.  The Court has recognized that in a custodial setting, government282
officials owe a duty of care to those who have been deprived of liberty.283
Officials who act with deliberate indifference to this duty of care should
be held liable for their conscience-shocking behavior. A showing of
objective deliberate indifference, combined with some showing of more
than de minimis injury, shocks the conscience and thus should sustain a
substantive due process claim.
C.  Public Education
In many cases, students bringing substantive due process claims have
alleged deprivations of liberty, usually in the form of corporal punishment,
sexual abuse, or verbal or physical harassment perpetrated by school
officials or fellow classmates. As to the last allegation, school officials
generally are not liable for the conduct of fellow students in light of
Supreme Court precedent refusing to recognize a duty to protect absent a
custodial relationship.  As previously discussed, the lower courts have284
unanimously rejected claims alleging a “mere” failure to protect from
private violence, even in a residential public-school environment, unless
the student was involuntarily placed in that environment.  Nonetheless,285
sexual abuse by teachers and other school officials violates the
fundamental right to bodily integrity and thus is actionable.  Other cases286
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(holding that substantive due process protects a child’s right to be free from sexual abuse by school
employees while attending public school); Doe v. Claiborne County ex rel. Claiborne County Bd.
of Educ., 103 F.3d 495, 506 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that every appellate court that has considered
the issue has recognized that the right to be free from sexual abuse at the hands of a public school
teacher is clearly protected by the Due Process Clause); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d
443, 451 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that a substantive due process right to bodily integrity is
necessarily violated when school officials sexually abuse a student).
287. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
288. Id. at 674–80. The Court found a liberty interest in being free from any “appreciable
physical pain,” id. at 674, but then concluded that state common-law remedies satisfied procedural
due process, id. at 682. The plaintiffs did not plead a substantive due process claim. Id. at 653.
289. Kirkland ex rel. Jones v. Greene County Bd. of Educ., 347 F.3d 903, 904 (11th Cir. 2003)
(holding that a high-school principal who repeatedly struck a thirteen-year-old student in head,
neck, and ribs with a metal cane—when the student was not armed or physically threatening in any
manner—violated the student’s substantive due process right to be free from excessive corporal
punishment; corporal punishment is arbitrary, capricious, and conscience-shocking when school
officials intentionally use an amount of force that is obviously excessive under the circumstances
and the force presented a reasonably foreseeable risk of serious bodily injury); Johnson v.
Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 251–52 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a student
assaulted by a gym teacher stated a claim under substantive due process where the force used far
surpassed anything that could reasonably be characterized as serving legitimate governmental
ends); Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1076 (11th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the district court improperly dismissed a substantive due process claim against a high-
school football coach who allegedly struck a student with a metal weight lock, causing the student
to lose the use of one eye); P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303–04 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that
school instructors who use excessive or unjustified force for malicious reasons violate substantive
due process; thus, a principal who physically assaulted his students, causing pain, bruising, and
emotional injury, when there was no need for force, was liable for substantive due process
violations); Metzger ex rel. Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520–21 (3d Cir. 1988) (reasoning
that if a physical-education instructor restrained students, resulting in broken bones and other
injuries with the intent to cause harm, the defendant is liable for crossing the “constitutional line”
separating common-law tort from deprivation of substantive due process); Garcia v. Miera, 817
F.2d 650, 653–54 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that corporal punishment that is so grossly excessive
that it shocks the conscience violates a student’s substantive due process rights), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 959 (1988).
involve disciplinary action taken against students for alleged misconduct
or for academic deficiency whereby a student is deprived of a property
interest in education. As in the other areas discussed, the appellate courts
strongly disagree whether substantive due process claims may be brought
by students and, if so, about what standard to apply in assessing whether
a violation has occurred.
The most well-accepted substantive due process claims involve
corporal punishment. In Ingraham ex rel. Ingraham v. Wright,  the287
Supreme Court recognized that imposing corporal punishment may
constitute a deprivation of liberty.  Several courts have held that where288
educators use excessive force, or any force without justification, they have
violated substantive due process.  However, a growing number of courts289
have asserted that the Fourth Amendment, rather than substantive due
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290. Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“The consequences of a teacher’s force against a student at school are generally analyzed under
the ‘reasonableness’ rubric of the Fourth Amendment, although courts historically applied
substantive due process analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment’s ‘shocks the conscience’ test.”);
see also Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 1995); Hassan v. Lubbock
Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F.3d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1995); Edwards v. Rees, 883 F.2d 882, 884 (10th
Cir. 1989); cf. Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that,
although claims by children subjected to intrusive physical examinations on school premises are
best addressed by the Fourth Amendment, not by substantive due process, parents’ claims alleging
deprivation of their right to direct and control the medical treatment of their children should be
adjudicated under the substantive due process clause), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1179 (2004).
291. 469 U.S. 325, 327–28 (1985).
292. Id. at 342.
293. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
294. Id. at 388.
295. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. State of Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 334 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir.
2003).
296. See Preschooler, 479 F.3d at 1180 (holding that a teacher used excessive force in
violation of the Fourth Amendment by seizing, slapping, slamming, and forcing a preschooler to
participate in self-beating—the teacher’s conduct was unreasonable in light of the child’s age and
disability); Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1305–06 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding
that, although a sheriff’s deputy serving as school resource officer had reason to seize and
interrogate a nine-year-old student after he observed her threatening her teacher, his handcuffing
of the student simply to punish her and teach her a lesson violated the student’s Fourth Amendment
rights because the punishment was not reasonably related to the scope of the circumstances that
justified the initial investigatory stop), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2428 (2007); Doe, 334 F.3d at
909–10 (holding that an elementary-school vice principal who taped a second-grade student’s head
to a tree for disciplinary purposes acted unreasonably and thus violated the Fourth Amendment);
see also Kathryn R. Urbonya, Determining Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment: Physical
Force to Control and Punish Students, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 440–52 (2001)
process, should govern any excessive-force claims involving seizure of a
student.  These cases rely on the Supreme Court decision in New Jersey290
v. T.L.O.,  where the Court applied a Fourth Amendment analysis to291
determine the validity of random drug searches in the school context. The
Court rejected a rigid probable-cause standard and instead determined that
school searches should be judged under a reasonableness test, which looks
to “the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”292
In addition, the Court in Graham v. Connor  directed courts to293
analyze claims of excessive force raised in the context of a search or
seizure under the more specific constitutional provision—the Fourth
Amendment—rather than the general notion of substantive due process.294
Although Graham arose in the criminal context, some courts have cited
Graham to support using the Fourth Amendment, rather than substantive
due process, in the school context.  In light of the reluctance of many295
lower courts to recognize substantive due process violations and to impose
a draconian shocks-the-conscience standard, plaintiffs might be well
advised to explore the Fourth Amendment and its reasonableness standard
to buttress their claims of abuse of government power.296
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(contending that, whereas the Fourth Amendment gives public-school authorities broad discretion
to use physical force to control students, the authorities lack discretion to use such force as
“punishment,” and thus the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to bar corporal punishment
in the schools); Kathryn R. Urbonya, Public School Officials’ Use of Physical Force as a Fourth
Amendment Seizure: Protecting Students from the Constitutional Chasm Between the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 38–41 (2000) (examining the history and
difficulty of students’ substantive due process claims challenging school officials’ use of physical
force).
297. See Doe, 334 F.3d at 909 (“[I]t may be possible for a school official to use excessive
force against a student without seizing or searching the student, and that the Fourth Amendment
would not apply to such conduct.”).
298. See Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874–75 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that
injuries resulting from corporal punishment do not give rise to Due Process Clause claims if there
are adequate state remedies to redress the harm inflicted); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807–08
(5th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging that, although a child hospitalized as a consequence of corporal
punishment was forced to spend six months in a psychiatric ward at a cost of $90,000, “injuries
sustained incidentally to corporal punishment, irrespective of the severity of these injuries or the
sensitivity of the student, do not implicate the due process clause if the forum state affords adequate
post-punishment civil or criminal remedies for the student to vindicate legal transgressions”). 
299. Dacosta v. Nwachukwa, 304 F.3d 1045, 1048–49 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that a battery
perpetrated by an instructor upon a college student did not shock the conscience and concluding
that remedies for this type of battery should be pursued under state tort law), cert. denied, 538 U.S.
908 (2003).
300. See supra notes 183–90 and accompanying text.
301. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 124–25 (1990); see also Mark R. Brown, De-
Federalizing Common Law Torts, Empathy for Parratt, Hudson, and Daniels, 28 B.C. L. REV. 813,
819 (1987) (“Substantive due process, in contrast [to procedural due process], assesses the propriety
of a state’s substantive decision. . . . The rationale . . . is that there are certain normative decisions
the state simply cannot make regardless of the majority’s wishes and regardless of any process.”);
In cases where school officials do not act for an investigatory or
administrative purpose, some courts have reasoned that the Fourth
Amendment cannot apply and thus substantive due process provides the
only protection.  Unfortunately, here again the trend has not favored297
plaintiffs. Many courts have rejected substantive due process claims
brought in the school context based on a finding that either an adequate
remedy already exists or that the harm inflicted does not shock the
conscience. For example, the Fifth Circuit has asserted that so long as the
state provides an adequate remedy, public-school students cannot claim
denial of substantive due process based on excessive corporal punishment,
irrespective of the severity of the injuries.  The Eleventh Circuit has298
similarly suggested that if a remedy may be pursued under state tort law,
the federal courthouse door should be closed to substantive due process
claims.  As previously discussed,  reliance on state tort remedies to299 300
defeat these claims confounds procedural with substantive due process.
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that state tort remedies are irrelevant
when substantive due process challenges are brought because the
deprivation of liberty is “complete” when it occurs and does not depend
upon the existence of state tort remedies.301
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Irene Merker Rosenberg, A Study in Irrationality: Refusal to Grant Substantive Due Process
Protection Against Excessive Corporal Punishment in the Public Schools, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 399,
424–37 (1990) (reasoning that state remedies are no more relevant to substantive due process
claims involving corporal punishment than they are to the racially discriminatory application of
corporal punishment: “[I]n Ingraham the state criminal and tort remedies were legally relevant only
to plaintiffs’ argument that they were entitled to a hearing prior to the infliction of appreciable
physical pain”).
302. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Half Hollow Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 168, 172–73 (2d Cir.
2002) (holding that, although there is no per se rule that a single slap from a teacher can never be
sufficiently brutal to shock the conscience, and conceding that striking a student without any
pedagogical or disciplinary justification is undeniably wrong, not all wrongs perpetrated by school
officials violate due process, and here the action could not be fairly viewed as so brutal or offensive
to human dignity as to shock the conscience); Gottlieb ex rel. Calabria v. Laurel Highlands Sch.
Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 174–75 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that an assistant principal who pushed a student
on the shoulder when the student was brought into the office did not meet the shocks-the-
conscience standard, even though the assistant principal failed to offer any justification for his use
of force, because (1) no reasonable jury could find that the assistant principal intended to harm the
student, (2) the student testified that she believed the principal did not intend to injure her—and the
plaintiff conceded that the push was slight, and (3) to be actionable, it is the harm, and not the mere
contact, that must be intended).
303. Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987)). 
304. Saylor v. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 507, 515 (6th Cir. 1997).
305. See Harris ex rel. Harris v. Robinson, 273 F.3d 927, 930–31 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding
that a teacher’s action was not inspired by malice or sadism and, to “shock the conscience,” the
“‘plaintiff must demonstrate a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual
harm that is truly conscience shocking’” (quoting Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 574 (10th Cir.
1995))); Hall ex rel. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he substantive due
process inquiry in school corporal punishment cases must be whether the force applied caused
In addition to the reliance on the existence of state tort remedies to
defeat corporal-punishment claims, other courts have imposed an
unnecessarily high threshold regarding conscience-shocking behavior. As
with all substantive due process claims, even arbitrary deprivations of
liberty require a showing of something more than de minimis injury to
shock the conscience.  On the other hand, a close examination of the302
appellate court decisions suggests that the courts impose an unduly
restrictive standard. For example, the Sixth Circuit has held that corporal
punishment does not violate substantive due process unless the student
proves that “‘the force applied caused injury so severe, was so
disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or
sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it
amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally
shocking to the conscience.’”  Thus, a teacher’s beating of a student,303
which involved five licks of the paddle on the student’s buttocks, causing
bruises, was not so severe or so inspired by malice or sadism as to shock
the conscience.  Decisions from the Fourth and Tenth Circuits have304
similarly imposed this “malice or sadism” test.  In other cases involving305
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injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or
sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and
inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience.”).
306. Harris, 273 F.3d at 931. 
307. See London ex rel. Avery v. Dirs. of the DeWitt Pub. Schs., 194 F.3d 873, 876–77 (8th
Cir. 1999) (holding that a teacher who removed a student from the cafeteria and banged the
student’s head against a pole did not violate the student’s substantive due process rights because
the severity of the injury was questionable and the district court was unable to find that the
teacher’s actions were motivated by bad faith or ill will so as to qualify as conscience-shocking
behavior); Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 725–26 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that
neither a single slap of a student nor rubbing of a student’s stomach, accompanied by a teacher’s
remark that could reasonably be interpreted as sexually suggestive, “amount[ed] to ‘a brutal and
inhumane abuse of . . . official power, literally shocking to the conscience’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Webb, 828 F.2d at 1159)); cf. Ellis, 455 F.3d at 700 (holding that a student successfully
stated a substantive due process violation by alleging that, simply because she forgot to bring a
pencil to class, her teacher grabbed her, slammed her head against the board, threw her on the
ground, and choked her for approximately one minute, resulting in contusions on her neck and post-
traumatic stress disorder).
308. Costello v. Mitchell Pub. Sch. Dist. 79, 266 F.3d 916, 919, 921 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding
that a student who was called “retarded” and “stupid” in front of her classmates by her band
teacher, who also struck the student in the face with a notebook, failed to establish that the conduct
was sufficiently shocking to state a substantive due process claim and thus summary judgment was
appropriate); Doe v. Gooden, 214 F.3d 952, 955 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that a teacher’s verbal
abuse of students, including allegedly yelling and screaming at them, using foul language, and
calling them names, was not actionable because use of patently offensive language is not a
constitutional violation); Abeyta ex rel. Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 19, 77
F.3d 1253, 1254–58 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that a teacher who called a student a prostitute and
permitted her classmates to taunt her over a period of weeks, even if done with the deliberate intent
to cause psychological harm, did not act with the high level of brutal and inhumane abuse of
official power that shocks the conscience as required to state a substantive due process violation).
humiliating disciplinary action—such as requiring a ten-year-old, mild-to-
moderately retarded boy to clean out a toilet with his bare
hands —federal judges have found that undeniably outrageous behavior306
did not shock the conscience.  In addition, courts have been reluctant to307
find a substantive due process violation for mere verbal abuse, but this
reluctance fails to recognize that emotional harm can devastate as much
as physical harm.308
These decisions confirm that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standard, unencumbered by notions of malice or sadism, may provide
greater protection to students where a “search or seizure” has occurred.
The thesis of this Article, however, is that substantive due process should
protect against all abuses of official power, and a remedy should not turn
on whether a plaintiff can show a “seizure” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. It is particularly unjust to deny children the
safeguards afforded adults who are being “seized” by law enforcement
officials. No less than in the Fourth Amendment context, juries should be
permitted to balance the extent of force in relation to need and the extent
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309. 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). The Court also found a liberty interest in not being stigmatized
by a disciplinary suspension. Id. at 575–76.
310. C.B. ex rel. Breeding v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 387 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that because
a decision to suspend a student is executive action, any deprivation of this state-created right is
protected only by the guarantee of procedural, not substantive, due process).
311. See, e.g., Tun v. Whitticker, 398 F.3d 899, 900–04 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that a
school’s decision to expel a student for public indecency and possession of pornography, although
perhaps an overreaction and an impermissible reading of the school district’s behavior code, did
not shock the conscience and thus did not violate substantive due process); Butler ex rel. Butler v.
Rio Rancho Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 341 F.3d 1197, 1199–201 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that a  one-
year suspension of a high-school student who drove a car in which a gun, knife, and drug
paraphernalia were found, was not arbitrary or capricious even if the student denied knowledge of
the items); Remer ex rel. M.R. v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 286 F.3d 1007, 1013–14 (7th Cir.
2002) (finding that even if the substantive due process analysis applied to a school’s disciplinary
decisions, permanent expulsion of a high-school student who allegedly participated in a conspiracy
to enter the school with guns and to shoot students and school officials was justified by the district’s
interest in providing a safe and stable learning environment); Dunn v. Fairfield Cmty. High Sch.
Dist. No. 225, 158 F.3d 962, 965–66 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that federal courts should not review
school disciplinary decisions or set them aside simply because they are arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion, because this would be contrary to the Supreme Court’s clear instruction that
substantive due process regarding executive action requires an extraordinary departure from
established norms); cf. Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
suspension or expulsion of a student for weapons possession, pursuant to a zero-tolerance policy,
even if the student did not knowingly possess any weapon, would not be rationally related to any
legitimate interest and thus violated substantive due process). 
312. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 223 (1985); Bd. of Curators
of the injury, as well as improper motive, to determine whether a teacher’s
or principal’s misconduct amounts to an abuse of official power that
shocks the conscience.
Just as the appellate courts have been reluctant to find substantive due
process violations in the absence of physical brutality, they have been
similarly reluctant to impose liability on school officials for arbitrary
decisions to suspend or expel students from public school. Despite the
Supreme Court’s recognition in Goss v. Lopez of a property interest in
continued education,  some courts have refused to recognize a309
substantive due process violation where students are deprived only of a
state-created right to attend school.  Thus, at the elementary- and310
secondary-school level, federal judges, while conceding that school
officials may have exercised questionable judgment or overreacted in
some cases, have nonetheless concluded that the officials’ response was
not conscience-shocking.311
The reluctance to review disciplinary decisions is particularly strong
for academic decision-making at the university level. As noted, the
Supreme Court assumed without deciding that university students have a
constitutionally protected property interest in their continued enrollment
in a university and that federal courts may review academic decisions
under a substantive due process standard.  However, in making such an312
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v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1978); see also cases discussed supra notes 82–86 and
accompanying text. 
313. See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 223; Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 84–85.
314. See, e.g., Salehpoor v. Shahinpoor, 358 F.3d 782, 786–87 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that
even if a student has a substantive property right in continued enrollment in a Ph.D. program, the
university’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious, and discharge occurred only after efforts
were made to resolve the situation), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 812 (2004); Richmond v. Fowlkes, 228
F.3d 854, 859 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that to succeed on a substantive due process claim, a student
must show that there was “no rational basis for the College’s decision or that dismissal was
motivated by bad faith or ill will unrelated to academic performance[,] . . . [and] ‘judges . . . should
show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment’” (quoting Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225));
Wheeler v. Miller, 168 F.3d 241, 250 (5th Cir. 1999) (asserting that academic decisions that are
“‘not beyond the pale of reasoned academic decision-making’” are consistent with due process
(quoting Ewing, 474 U.S. at 227–28)); Disesa v. St. Louis Cmty. Coll., 79 F.3d 92, 95–96 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding that a nursing student who received a failing grade “must show that there was no
rational basis for the College’s decision or that the decision was motivated by bad faith or ill will”);
Megenity v. Stenger, 27 F.3d 1120, 1125 (6th Cir. 1994) (cautioning that, especially in the area of
judicial review of academic decisions, courts should defer to university authorities, and a student
must clearly allege why or how an academic decision was arbitrary and capricious); cf. Gossett v.
Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents for Langston Univ., 245 F.3d 1172, 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding
that a student presented sufficient evidence to prove that the decision to require his withdrawal from
his nursing program was motivated by impermissible discrimination, and thus the district court
erred in granting summary judgment; “judicial deference to academic decisions loses force
when . . . the decisionmaker is ‘accused of concealing nonacademic or constitutionally
impermissible reasons.’” (quoting Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225)).
315. See, e.g., C.B. ex rel Breeding v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 387 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The right
to attend a public school is a state-created, rather than a fundamental, right for the purposes of
substantive due process. . . . Therefore, the ‘right’ to avoid school suspension may be abridged as
long as proper procedural protections are afforded . . . .”).
316. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 229–30 (Powell, J., concurring).
317. Id. 
assumption, the Court warned that courts should give substantial deference
to academic decisions.  The same approach is clearly reflected in313
decisions of the lower courts.314
Although courts should give due deference to academic decisions, as
established by the Supreme Court’s analysis in Horowitz and Ewing, these
decisions do not mandate total abdication of judicial review. Those
opinions that have refused even to recognize a substantive due process
claim for “state created education rights” have erroneously followed
Justice Powell’s concurrence in Ewing, not the majority opinion.  Justice315
Powell argued that property rights derived solely from state law should not
constitute substantive due process rights protected by the Constitution.316
According to Justice Powell, such state law contract rights “bear[] little
resemblance to the fundamental interests” deemed protected by the
Constitution, and thus should not receive federal substantive due process
protection.  317
Justice Powell’s analysis, which did not reflect the majority’s position,
appeared to confuse the doctrine that substantive due process provides
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318. See supra Part II.A.
319. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 36–45 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
322. Youngberg v. Romeo ex rel. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982). The Court also asserted
that patients who are “involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment . . . than
criminals.” Id. at 321–22. Certainly the same is true of students in state educational institutions.
323. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
324. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188–89 (1928).
“heightened” protection to so-called fundamental rights with the generic
concept that substantive due process protects against all types of arbitrary,
capricious government decision-making that deprives individuals of their
liberty. As to the former, the Supreme Court has clearly applied an
exceedingly stringent test and, as discussed previously, has thus been
reluctant to identify rights as “fundamental.”  Traditional substantive due318
process analysis, however, has always permitted the challenger, even in
the absence of a fundamental right, to prove the total arbitrariness of the
government conduct.  Further, the Court has moved away from this319
stringent two-tier analysis in reviewing legislative enactments under the
Due Process Clause in favor of a more nuanced balancing approach.320
Therefore, the analysis of student claims should not be prematurely
truncated by an artificially narrow definition of property or liberty. 
In addition, requiring that an educator’s conduct be inspired by malice
or sadism to meet the shocks-the-conscience test proves unwarranted in
light of Lewis’s explanation that a deliberate-indifference standard governs
except in an emergency situation.  Further, in Youngberg, the Supreme321
Court held that, although a state hospital’s decisions affecting
involuntarily committed patients are “presumptively valid,” those
decisions may trigger liability if they reflect “such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision
on such a judgment.”  Similarly, courts should not hesitate to find a322
violation of substantive due process where a school official’s misconduct
reflects a substantial breach of sound educational judgment.
D.  Land Regulation
In 1926, the Supreme Court established that the government violates
substantive due process when its regulation of real property is “clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”  In 1928, the Court ruled that323
a zoning ordinance that did not bear a substantial relation to public welfare
violated substantive due process.  Recent Supreme Court decisions324
acknowledge the continued vitality of these decisions. In 2005, in Lingle
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325. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
326. Id. at 542.
327. Id. at 540–42.
328. Id. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 550
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Although rejecting the
plurality’s opinion that a federal statute that demanded compensation for harms to coalminers’
health constituted a takings violation, Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, reasoning that
the legislation was void because it violated substantive due process. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 550
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Further, four dissenting Justices,
in an opinion by Justice Breyer, agreed that a substantive due process analysis was appropriate,
although they determined there was no violation. Id. at 556, 566–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
329. See supra Part II.B; see also Michael J. Phillips, The Slow Return of Economic
Substantive Due Process, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 917, 924–26 (1999) (suggesting that economic
substantive due process is making a resurgence); Randall T. Shepard, Land Use Regulation in the
Rehnquist Court: The Fifth Amendment and Judicial Intervention, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 847 (1989)
(asserting that substantive due process, rather than the Takings Clause, provides a better tool for
assessing the validity of land use regulation).
330. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1988). The distinction between
legislative and administrative conduct does, however, have implications for relief. The Supreme
Court in Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 52 (1998), ruled that local government officials,
including mayors and city council members, enjoy absolute immunity when they engage in
legislative activity. In a unanimous opinion, the Court reasoned that “[r]egardless of the level of
government the exercise of legislative discretion should not be inhibited by judicial interference
or distorted by the fear of personal liability.” Id. Further, illicit motive was irrelevant because
immunity “turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official
performing it.” Id. at 54. It suffices that a decision reflects a discretionary, policymaking choice that
applies prospectively and affects a large number of constituents. Id. at 55–56.
Many lower courts have relied on Bogan to grant absolute legislative immunity to local zoning
board members or members of other administrative agencies when they act in a legislative capacity,
v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,  the Court cited these cases for the proposition325
that substantive due process prohibits land regulation that does not
substantially advance a government interest: “[A] regulation that fails to
serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or
irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause.”  While rejecting326
the “substantially advances” test as part of a Takings Clause analysis, the
Court explained that this test stems from due process, which provides an
independent and legitimate basis for attacking government deprivations of
property.  Indeed, in a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy327
acknowledged that the rejection of the takings claim “does not foreclose
the possibility that a regulation might be so arbitrary or irrational as to
violate due process.”  Some legal commentators have asserted that the328
Court’s recent property decisions, including its punitive damages
decisions, suggest that economic substantive due process is making a
comeback.  329
Although some of the Court’s property decisions may have technically
involved legislative rather than executive action, the opinions do not
distinguish between legislative or administrative regulation in applying a
substantive due process analysis.  The lower courts, however, appear330
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regardless of the arbitrariness or improper motivations of the decisions. See Biblia Abierta v.
Banks, 129 F.3d 899, 905 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that city aldermen enjoyed absolute legislative
immunity for introducing and voting on a zoning ordinance that prevented churches from
purchasing particular parcels of property in the aldermen’s wards, even if the conduct was based
on improper motive, because such activities were elements of a core legislative process); Acierno
v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 611–15 (3d Cir. 1994) (granting absolute immunity to members of a
county council with regard to a zoning decision because the decision was both substantively and
procedurally legislative in character—it required policymaking and was done pursuant to
established legislative procedures, even if the decision was directed at a small group rather than the
community at large); Fry v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 7 F.3d 936, 942 (10th Cir. 1993) (upholding
absolute legislative immunity on behalf of county commissioners despite allegations that they and
landowners jointly conceived and executed a plan to vacate a road in retaliation for property
owners’ exercise of their First Amendment rights, because individual motive is irrelevant when a
decision is made following an open public meeting in which all parties are heard); Brown v.
Crawford County, 960 F.2d 1002, 1012 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that county commissioners enjoy
absolute immunity for their conduct in imposing a temporary moratorium on issuance of permits
for mobile homes because such was a legislative function even if conspiracy or bad motive could
be proved).
On the other hand, while Bogan holds that motive is irrelevant to the immunity question, the
Court also distinguished between decisions that have broad prospective implication and those that
apply only to a particular individual. 523 U.S. at 55–56. Thus, some courts have reasoned that,
although improper motive does not eliminate immunity, a decision will not be characterized as
legislative when it applies only to particular individuals and does not concern broad policymaking.
See, e.g., Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a
city manager and a city planner did not enjoy legislative immunity from a claim that they
improperly delayed processing a wrecking-yard owner’s applications for city approval of his license
renewal because processing an individual application pursuant to an established policy is not a
legislative function); Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 273 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
mayor’s repeated vetoes of a developer’s site plans and the use of delaying tactics to prevent
approval of the developer’s plans were not protected by legislative immunity because the decisions
did not involve broad policymaking); Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369, 1392 (11th
Cir. 1993) (distinguishing the promulgation of zoning ordinances and general moratoriums on
development plans, which trigger absolute immunity, from a land use decision that simply applies
policy to a specific party and thus is not insulated by legislative immunity).
Finally, note that although Bogan immunizes local government officials sued individually for
damages, the local government entity enjoys no such immunity, and thus, substantive due process
claims seeking prospective injunctive relief and damages should not be dismissed despite the
“legislative” nature of the decision-making. See Langford v. City of Atlantic City, 235 F.3d 845,
849 (3d Cir. 2000) (joining several circuits in holding that absolute legislative immunity is not
available to a municipality even for decisions that are legislative in character).
331. See Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1220–21 (6th Cir. 1992) (discussing
the various opinions in the appellate courts).
more concerned about this distinction. Some courts consider all zoning
decisions legislative and thus subject to only the most limited review;
some apply a rationality standard, without differentiating between
legislative or administrative actions; whereas others classify the decisions
by local legislative bodies as legislative and the decisions of administrative
boards as administrative.  Arguably, courts should give less deference to331
administrative decisions of those government officials who have not been
elected, thereby reducing the counter-majoritarian argument. In addition,
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332. This distinction has been recognized by the Supreme Court and lower courts in assessing
legislative immunity. Whereas broad, prospective policy-based determinations are shielded by
immunity, decisions implementing policy or affecting a single individual do not enjoy such
immunity. See supra note 330. In addition, the Court has acknowledged that individuals who have
been subjected to selective or unequal enforcement of local development rules may bring a “class
of one” equal-protection challenge. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
Justice Breyer cautioned that the “irrationality and wholly arbitrary” standard is extremely difficult
for a plaintiff to meet in a zoning dispute. Id. at 565–66 (Breyer, J., concurring). It is doubtful that
the standard is any less stringent than that needed to show a substantive due process violation. See,
e.g., Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Ind., 385 F.3d 274, 287 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 201
(2007).
333. See DeKalb Stone, Inc. v. County of DeKalb, 106 F.3d 956, 959–60 (11th Cir. 1997)
(holding that land use rights are state-created rights protected only by procedural and not
substantive due process and thus the arbitrary and capricious deprivation of landowner’s right to
use his land did not violate substantive due process); Nestor Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v.
Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 45–47 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that substantive due process normally should
not give rise to claims regarding local planning disputes, nor do allegations of political interference
with the permit process give rise to a substantive due process violation).
334. See O’Mara v. Town of Wappinger, 485 F.3d 693, 700 (2d Cir. 2007) (reasoning that to
establish a protected property interest for purposes of substantive due process property owners must
show a clear entitlement to a land benefit over which the issuing authority has no discretion, and
because a certificate of occupancy fails to meet this standard, landowners could not assert that its
denial violated a cognizable property interest); George Wash. Univ. v. Dist. of Columbia, 318 F.3d
203, 206–07 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that the Second, Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have determined that the existence of a property interest for substantive due process
purposes depends on the degree of discretion exercised by government officials in granting or
withholding the relevant permission, whereas the Third Circuit has found that any ownership
interest in the land qualifies as a protected property interest), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 824 (2003);
Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 432 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a city’s decision to
develop a dedicated roadway did not violate a church’s reversionary property interest because the
land was always subject to the city’s superior right to develop the roadway for a public purpose,
and the absence of a property right meant there could be no violation of substantive due process);
Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 274–76 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a developer who
signed a contract to purchase land on which to develop an apartment complex and who put money
down on the contract did not have a property right to build the apartment when the mayor blocked
decisions affecting individual property owners, rather than broad
prospective policy-based determinations, raise a heightened risk of
improper motivation, warranting closer judicial scrutiny.  In any event,332
arbitrary decisions that lack a legitimate basis or a proper motive violate
substantive due process.
Despite the apparent trend in the Supreme Court to protect property
rights, the lower courts have imposed numerous barriers to challenging
land use regulation. Some decisions state that these claims involve merely
state-created rights that substantive due process does not protect.333
Similarly, several appellate courts have rejected substantive due process
challenges based on a theory that landowners have neither a property
interest in an existing zoning classification nor particular development
rights where government officials retain discretion to grant or withhold
permission.  The Seventh Circuit has imposed its own unique334
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the developer’s ability to obtain a building permit); DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163
F.3d 124, 130–33 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff could not establish a substantive due
process right to an existing zoning classification nor to approvals that were necessary for
constructing a shopping center in light of the zoning board’s wide discretion to deny permits).
335. Centres, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, 148 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
arbitrary, capricious denial of a building permit failed to state a substantive due process claim
because the plaintiff did not demonstrate that state remedies were inadequate); Contreras v. City
of Chi., 119 F.3d 1286, 1295 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that even if the city’s suspension of a license
after a warrantless inspection was arbitrary and irrational, the plaintiff did not show the inadequacy
of state law remedies, a necessary element of a substantive due process violation); Doherty v. City
of Chi., 75 F.3d 318, 325–26 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the view that political bias in land use
decisions may give rise to a substantive due process claim despite the adequacy of state remedies).
336. Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 471 F.3d 363, 369–70 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that although
a town’s use of a landowner’s parcel as a turnaround for snow plows in the winter and its paving
of a road that encroached on the property was incorrect or ill-advised, it was not the type of
conscience-shocking behavior that implicates substantive due process rights); Torromeo v. Town
of Fremont, 438 F.3d 113, 118 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that the threshold for establishing the
requisite abuse of government power in land use disputes is exceedingly high and is limited to truly
horrendous situations; thus, even though a town unjustifiably delayed issuing a permit, contrary to
state procedures, such conduct was not conscience-shocking), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 257 (2006);
SFW Arecibo, Ltd. v. Rodriguez, 415 F.3d 135, 141 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that a planning board’s
erroneous decision to revoke a permit in violation of state law could not be categorized as “truly
horrendous” and thus failed to meet the threshold for alleging a substantive due process violation);
Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 285–86 (holding that allegations that officials selectively applied
subdivision requirements, pursued unannounced and unnecessary enforcement and inspection
actions, delayed permits and approvals, improperly increased tax assessments, and maligned
landowners, are examples of typical land disputes that frequently arise in planning and are
insufficient to shock the conscience), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1075 (2005); United Artists Theatre
Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 400–02 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting  precedent that
allowed substantive due process challenges to land use decisions where officials allegedly acted
with improper motive, joining several other circuits in holding that landowners must establish that
officials’ actions shocked the conscience, and stating that land disputes should not be transformed
into substantive due process claims based only on allegations of improper motive); Harlen Assocs.
v. Incorporated Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 503–05 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that substantive due
process does not forbid government actions that might fairly be deemed arbitrary or capricious, but
rather the standard is “‘violated only by conduct that is so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute
a gross abuse of governmental authority’” (quoting Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258,
263 (2d Cir. 1999))); Crider v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 246 F.3d 1285, 1289–90 (10th Cir. 2001)
(holding that a plaintiff must show that the government’s purpose has no conceivable rational
relation to the existence of the state’s traditional police power, and thus, even assuming that the
defendants acted with improper motive—such as a conspiracy to obtain the plaintiff’s property at
a decreased cost—no cognizable substantive due process claim exists because actual motivations
are irrelevant if some rational basis is asserted for the challenged action); Barrington Cove Ltd.
P’ship v. R.I. Hous. & Mortgage Fin. Corp., 246 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that even if a
requirement, consistently ruling that landowners may not bring a
substantive due process claim unless they allege that state remedies are
inadequate.  Still, other circuits have imposed an extremely stringent335
shocks-the-conscience standard, asserting that to meet this high threshold
landowners must show more than that decisions are arbitrary or capricious,
or improperly motivated.  Finally, some courts have thrown out336
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state housing director violated regulations in requiring a developer to make a sizeable contribution
to a housing trust fund and made comments about the developer that might be characterized as
harsh and callous, the director’s conduct did not “shock the conscience” for substantive due process
purposes); Bituminous Materials, Inc. v. Rice County, 126 F.3d 1068, 1070–71 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that allegations that a county board’s restrictions on a contractor’s permit were motivated
by the personal animus of three county commissioners were insufficient to support a substantive
due process claim); Norton v. Vill. of Corrales, 103 F.3d 928, 931–32 (10th Cir. 1996) (cautioning
that federal courts should be reluctant to interfere in zoning disputes and should not look beyond
a stated legitimate government interest for evidence that government officials acted out of personal
animosity or bias).
337. See, e.g., Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 948–50 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that allegations of arbitrary and capricious land use decision-making cannot be challenged
under substantive due process whenever the Takings Clause applies, even if the takings claim
would be unsuccessful); Banks v. City of Whitehall, 344 F.3d 550, 554 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that
the Fifth Amendment, not substantive due process, generally provides the basis for challenging
government action with respect to property); S. County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of S.
Kingstown, 160 F.3d 834, 835–36 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that a suit challenging an ordinance that
prohibited excavation in certain areas without a special-use permit was a “garden-variety”
regulatory-takings claim and not a substantive due process claim); Bickerstaff Clay Products Co.
v. Harris County ex rel. Bd. of Comm’rs, 89 F.3d 1481, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
takings claim subsumes landowners’ substantive due process claims, and thus, a challenge to the
validity of a zoning classification lies only under the Takings Clause); Gosnell v. City of Troy, 59
F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 1995) (cautioning that developers cannot move land use disputes into
federal courts simply by asserting a substantive due process claim rather than a takings claim). 
338. See George Wash. Univ. v. Dist. of Columbia, 318 F.3d 203, 207 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting
that the Second, Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have determined that the existence
of a property interest for substantive due process purposes depends on the degree of discretion
exercised by government officials in granting or withholding the relevant permission, whereas the
Third Circuit has found that any ownership interest in the land qualifies as a protected property
interest), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 824 (2003).
339. See Mark W. Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Zoning Decisionmaking,
65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 161, 168 (1989) (“[T]he ad hoc, discretionary nature of [zoning] decisions
makes them subject to substantial abuse and unfairness.”).
340. See supra notes 183–90 and accompanying text; see also Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz,
substantive due process claims by maintaining that the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment preempts such claims.337
In light of the Supreme Court’s recent reaffirmation of substantive due
process as a limitation on arbitrary, capricious government decisions
regarding land regulation, the various obstacles imposed by the appellate
courts appear unjustified. First, courts should recognize an ownership
interest in land as a protected property interest, rather than focusing on the
question whether the plaintiff has a property right to a certain building
permit or zoning decision.  The argument that landowners have no rights338
because regulatory decisions are discretionary is misplaced because the
discretionary nature of land use decisions makes the decisions susceptible
to substantial abuse and unfairness.  Second, the Seventh Circuit’s339
position is misguided because state remedies are irrelevant to the question
whether a substantive due process violation has occurred.  Third, the340
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980 F.2d 84, 96–97 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that any requirement that a landowner first seek
compensation in state courts is derived from the Takings Clause and is unrelated to substantive due
process, which is premised on arbitrary and capricious government conduct); Sinaloa Lake Owners
Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1407–08 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the existence
of state remedies does not affect a landowner’s claim that the defendant violated the landowner’s
right to substantive due process by breaching a dam that adversely affected the property), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990); Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 607 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding that the placement of arbitrary conditions on granting a building permit may violate
substantive due process regardless of the existence of state remedies).
341. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005); see also Action Apartment
Ass’n v. Santa Monica Rent Control Opinion Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing
that Lingle effectively overruled the portion of Squaw finding a blanket prohibition on substantive
due process claims based on deprivations of real property).
342. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
343. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.
344. See id. at 545. The plurality in Lingle cautioned against using a “heightened means–end
review” of regulations affecting private property: “[W]e have long eschewed such heightened
scrutiny when addressing substantive due process challenges to government regulation.” Id. But see
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (holding that conditional grants that
mandate the conveyance of real property must “substantially advance” a legitimate state interest
to avoid a finding of a regulatory taking).
takings–preemption argument ignores the Supreme Court’s admonitions
that the “substantially advances” inquiry of substantive due process “is
logically prior to and distinct from the question whether a regulation
effects a taking” and that government action may be so arbitrary that it
violates due process regardless of any amount of compensation that might
be paid.  341
Finally, using a draconian shocks-the-conscience standard that
mandates more than a showing that a decision is arbitrary, capricious, or
motivated by political or other improper reasons, is unwarranted. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that substantive due process protects
against land use decisions that are “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare.”  Further, the Court acknowledged in 2005 that “[t]he342
‘substantially advances’ formula . . . has some logic in the context of a due
process challenge, for a regulation that fails to serve any legitimate
governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul
of the Due Process Clause.”  The Court may ultimately reject a343
requirement that land regulation “substantially advance” a legitimate
government interest.  But the Court should recognize that, at a minimum,344
decision-making that is not rationally related to legitimate government
interests or that is motivated by bias, bad faith, or improper motive,
violates substantive due process regardless of the availability of a takings
claim or state remedies.
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345. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
346. See, e.g., Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found. v. City of Cuyahoga Falls, 263 F.3d 627, 641–44
(6th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court erred in dismissing a substantive due process case
where there were material fact issues as to whether the city’s denial of a developer’s plan for a low-
income housing project was arbitrary and irrational because government officials who deny a
landowner the benefit of a general zoning scheme, despite knowledge that the property use is
entirely consistent with that scheme, violate the Due Process Clause), rev’d in part, vacated in part,
538 U.S. 188 (2003); Conroe Creosoting Co. v. Montgomery County, 249 F.3d 337, 341–42 (5th
Cir. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff’s allegations that state officials signed false affidavits in
support of a tax warrant and authorized the complete disbursement of a company’s assets without
legal authority constituted oppressive executive action that violated substantive due process);
Woodwind Estates Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 123–25 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that the
district court erred in dismissing a substantive due process claim where there was evidence that the
defendants denied the developers’ building plan based upon an improper motive); Catanzaro v.
Weiden, 140 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the mayor and county commissioner’s
decision to order immediate emergency demolition of the owner’s buildings allegedly pursuant to
a predisposition to destroy all buildings in a deteriorated community would be constitutionally
oppressive and thus sufficient to violate substantive due process); Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem
Twp., 57 F.3d 253, 267–68 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that allegations that defendants deliberately and
improperly interfered with the process whereby a township issues permits based on reasons that
were unrelated to the application would, if proven, establish a substantive due process violation);
Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the
district court improperly dismissed a developer’s claim that his due process rights were violated
when the town withheld occupancy permits to coerce the developer to convey condominium units
to the town, because such a decision would be arbitrary and thus a violation of due process);
DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 600–601 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the
district court erred in dismissing a landowner’s claim where there was a genuine fact issue as to
whether the zoning decision was influenced by the zoning secretary’s personal financial interest
in the resolution of the landowner’s zoning problems); Reserve, Ltd. v. Town of Longboat Key, 17
F.3d 1374, 1379–80 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that the district court erroneously granted summary
judgment where the plaintiff alleged that he was deprived of a constitutionally protected property
interest for an improper motive through pretextual, arbitrary, and capricious means); Parkway
Garage, Inc. v. City of Phila., 5 F.3d 685, 692 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a substantive due process
violation is proven either if the government’s actions are not rationally related to the government’s
interest or if the government’s actions in a particular case are motivated by bias, bad faith, or
improper motive); Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1508
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff stated a viable substantive due process claim by alleging
that city council members approved the plaintiff’s project with fifteen conditions and then after the
conditions were met abruptly changed course and rejected the plan due to pressure from neighbors
and illegitimate regulatory concerns); Marks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308, 312 (4th Cir.
1989) (holding that if the city council denied the plaintiff’s permit application solely to placate
religious objections made by some members of the public, then the council acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in violation of the Due Process Clause). 
Even applying the stringent shocks-the-conscience standard, the
Supreme Court in Lewis clarified that where government officials have
time to deliberate yet act with deliberate indifference to individual rights,
they have engaged in conscience-shocking behavior that triggers
liability.  The volume of cases in which those courts that have recognized345
substantive due process protection in the area of land use regulation have
actually found that government officials acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
for improper motives, confirms the importance of this safeguard.346
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Substantive due process claims will serve both to deter such wrongdoing
and to provide a remedy when wrongdoing occurs.
V.  CONCLUSION
Historically, substantive due process has been available to challenge
egregious deprivations of property and liberty, whether perpetrated
through legislative enactments or by the misconduct of government
officials. The Supreme Court has broadly defined the term “liberty” to
deter and punish abuses of government power, and has continued to
recognize substantive due process as an important guarantee against
arbitrary deprivations of property. Although some recent Supreme Court
decisions have significantly curtailed the reach of substantive due process
as a protection for personal liberty, many appellate courts have adopted an
unduly expansive interpretation of Supreme Court precedent and have
created new obstacles lacking basis under current doctrine. Too often,
federal courts have denied relief in cases alleging abuse of government
power by erroneously finding that substantive due process does not apply,
either because of the absence of a “constitutionally protected” property or
fundamental liberty interest, or because of the existence of state remedies.
Other appellate courts have refused to find that an official’s conduct
“shocks the conscience,” no matter how egregious, thereby ignoring the
Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of the deliberate-indifference standard in
all cases where there is time to deliberate.
There is no justification for the lower courts’ restrictive construction
of the substantive due process guarantee. When a plaintiff can establish
that government officials have abused their power by arbitrarily depriving
her of a property or liberty interest within the historically broad meaning
of those terms, federal courts should not hesitate to recognize substantive
due process as an established guarantee “against arbitrary action of
government.”
